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Renewed violent attacks in Saudi Arabia against the monarchy, combined with 
growing concern over royal corruption has led some analysts to predict that Saudi Arabia 
is likely to be “the next Iran”—that Islamist revolutionaries will come to power in 
Riyadh.  I test this theory through the lens of network analysis in order to measure the 
degree of state-society integration in Pahlavi Iran and Saudi Arabia.  My analysis finds 
that a) the Saudi state is far more integrated in society through social networks than the 
Pahlavi state; and b) the radical opposition in Saudi is far less entrenched in society than 
the Khomeini-led opposition in Iran, a movement that was able to activate significant 
informal urban networks to mobilize the population.  While both are rentier states, Saudi 
networks in society have effectively overcome the structural state weakness and potential 
instability that distributive political economies often engender.  The shah had no 
equivalent system of networks linking regime to society, and thus was more vulnerable to 
revolution. 
Thus, while Saudi Arabia has significant internal problems, it is highly unlikely 
that those problems will be manifested as a social revolution.  Persistent demands for 
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A. SCOPE AND PURPOSE    
In a recent Atlantic Monthly article, Richard Clarke, a counterterrorism advisor 
during the Clinton Administration wrote a futuristic look back at the post-9/11 years.  
“The Saudi coup marked one of the worst U.S. intelligence failures in years.  We were 
caught off guard because we had not been able to effectively collect intelligence inside 
“the kingdom,” as it was then called.  We relied on the Saudi Ministry of the Interior to 
tell us how strong the jihadis1 were, and whether there was serious opposition to the 
king” (Clarke, 2005).  No such coup has taken place as of this writing, but Mr. Clarke is 
not alone among knowledgeable students of the Middle East in his doom-saying.  
Michael Doran, a respected Near East scholar, describes Saudi Arabia as “in the throes of 
a crisis” (Doran, 2004).  Robert Baer, a career CIA field officer in the Middle East, has 
also suggested the imminent demise of the Saudi regime: “…the country is run by an 
increasingly dysfunctional royal family…today’s Saudi Arabia can’t last much longer—
and the social and economic fallout of the demise could be calamitous” (Baer, 2003b).   
The last calamitous regime collapse in the Middle East, from the U.S. perspective, 
was the fall of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, and the establishment of 
an Islamic theocracy in the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1978-79.  This event shocked 
U.S. foreign policy makers and completely disrupted the balance of power in the Middle 
East.  This thesis examines the Iranian case in order to answer the question, “Is the Saudi 
opposition structurally capable of toppling the Al Saud?”  I argue that the most important 
factor for either regime durability or opposition success is state-society integration.  
Iran’s opposition was firmly rooted in society through informal urban networks, while the 
Shah’s regime was not.  Conversely, the Al Saud are well integrated with Saudi society 
                                                 
1 Jihad is a contested term in the Islamic world.  Most Muslims think of jihad as a struggle against 
ones internal demons, although the term also connotes holy war against nonbelievers, or infidels.  Jihadi is 
a name commonly ascribed to violent Islamic radicals by western commentators, but to Islamic holy 
warriors by adherents to radical-leaning interpreters of Islam.  Other terms include jihadist and jihadism, 
which describe, respectively, members of jihadi political factions and the political ideology of jihad.  A 
more detailed description can be found in Chapter II. 
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through extensive patronage networks, while the Saudi opposition which seeks to 
overthrow the regime is marginalized. 
The thesis question implies, by using the term “opposition,’ that a unified, or at 
least organized, political force is functioning to check the power of the current Saudi 
regime.  This is not clearly the case.  There are fragments of Saudi society who are 
opposed to the royal family’s firm grip on real political and economic power and the 
absence of civil liberties which western societies take for granted: freedom of speech, 
freedom of religion, and universal suffrage.  The traditional religious establishment, on 
the other hand, is firmly behind (and well paid by) the regime, but opposes the reformist 
agenda.  Another influential group of clerics criticize both the royal family and violent 
Islamic radicals.  The only violent threat to the government, however, comes from 
Clarke’s aforementioned jihadis, Islamic revolutionaries promoting an ideology rich with 
the symbols and slogans whose ownership determines the legitimacy of power in Saudi 
Arabia, the cradle of Islam.   
The thesis question also implies that the Saudi opposition wants to topple the 
Saudi royal family.  This is certainly true for the aforementioned Islamic revolutionaries, 
whose 1996 Declaration of War against “American Crusaders” on the Arabian Peninsula 
claimed that armed struggle is necessary to defeat the apostate Al Saud regime by 
defeating the regime’s source of strength2 (Al-Mass’ari, 1996). By their own accounts, 
Usama bin Laden (UBL) and al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP)3 aim to foment a 
revolution which removes the ruling family in order to establish a nation which conforms 
to a puritanical version of Islam—a revolution that would undoubtedly have at least as 
great an impact as the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979.  The alternatives to a full-
fledged revolution are a coup d’etat (in which Islamic radicals succeed in snatching 
power from the royal family without an accompanying social-political-religious 
movement), reforms which entail the gradual distribution of power away from the royal 
                                                 
2 The need to defeat the alleged American root of the Arabian Peninsula’s problems is poetically 
stated: “[T]he shadow cannot be straighten [sic] when its’ [sic] source, the rod, is not straight either” (Al-
Mass’ari (trans.), 1996). 
3 “QAP” is an acronym used by the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2004a; ICG 2004b) for “al Qaeda 
on the Arabian Peninsula”. 
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family into democratic-looking bodies and institutions, or preservation of the status quo.  
The Islamic movement which overthrew the Shah also contained a mixture of reformers 
and radicals.  The various constituencies within the movement coalesced around 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s religious ideology and succeeded in changing the 
existing social and political order in Iran.  The thrust of this thesis is to assess whether 
those opposed to the current Saudi regime have the organizational potential, as in Iran, to 
take real political power away from the Al Saud. 
 
B. WHY IS THIS SIGNIFICANT? 
The Saudi regime’s survival and continued strength is an important topic to any 
entity that desires a stable Middle East, such as the United States or any other 
industrialized nation whose economic position relies heavily on a reliable source of oil.  
While Saudi Arabia provides only between twelve and thirteen percent of America’s oil 
imports (API, 2005), the desert kingdom has been for decades an important strategic 
partner of the United States.   The fact that there are questions about the regime’s 
durability is evident from the volume of reporting, analysis, and thoughtful opinion on 
the subject.  People who know and study Saudi Arabia arrive at various positions along a 
spectrum, one end of which optimistically predicts that the regime will continue to 
dominate Saudi Arabia, while those at the opposite end of the spectrum are counting the 
days until the regime, already decaying from within, crumbles back into the desert.  This 
thesis is not intended to reinvent the wheel in order to place one more graduate student’s 
marker somewhere along the spectrum.  Rather, this thesis offers an assessment based on 
a comparison of the structures of the government and opposition of Saudi Arabia today 
with the same structures present at the time of Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1978-1979, 
the only successful, full-fledged revolution in the Islamic world to date. 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
1. A Survey of the Literature 
In order to conduct a comparison of Khomeini’s Iran and today’s Saudi Arabia I 
have surveyed literature on three main topics: (1) the Iranian Islamic Revolution (relying 
heavily on Gary Sick for the American perspective, and Said Amir Arjomand for the 
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Iranian view); (2) current events and analysis of Saudi Arabia (from the aforementioned 
Doran, Baer, and Clarke, and from Gregory Gause and others who hold a more optimistic 
opinion); and (3) Revolutions in general (such as Guilain Denoeux’s authoritative 
analysis of the impact of informal urban networks, Urban Unrest in the Middle East 
(1993), a more recent study by Jeff Goodwin (2001) entitled No Other Way Out) and a 
number on Islamic revolution in particular (I find Bernard Lewis’ 1988 article Islamic 
Revolution, and Henry Munson’s Islam and Revolution in the Middle East very helpful).  
Reviewing this and other literature reveals some relevant bases for comparison of the two 
countries/contexts as well as obstacles that must be overcome in order to make a credible 
comparison.  
a. The Iranian Islamic Revolution4 
The literature on the Iranian Islamic Revolution does not yield a common 
denominator on the precipitating cause(s) of the revolution.  Most writers concur, 
however, on the themes which created the context of social upheaval and political 
instability in which the revolution occurred: widespread popular discontent and alienation 
as a result of the Shah’s rapid modernization programs and consequent rapid economic 
growth and rural-urban migration; nationalist resentment of foreign domination; 
weakness, corruption, and repressiveness of the Pahlavi regime; Islamic revival (which 
coincided with the societal changes wrought by rapid modernization and migration to the 
cities); and Khomeini’s charismatic leadership which consolidated the opposition and 
enabled it to exploit the regime’s weaknesses.   
b. The Current Saudi Situation 
Saudi Arabia is today the subject of a great many articles, books, 
conferences, editorials, etc.  These publications cover both external issues, i.e. Saudi 
Arabia as it relates to the Middle East and the international community, particularly with 
regard to the global oil supply; and internal, i.e. domestic politics, including the 
inseparable elements of Islamist movements, political reform, and social reform.  These 
categories cannot be easily separated, however, since the Al Saud’s decision-making 
                                                 
4 For readers unfamiliar with the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Gary Sick’s All Fall Down provides a 
thorough account from the American national security decision-making perspective, while Said Amir 
Arjomand’s The Turban for the Crown presents an in-depth account of the revolution’s historical 
precursors, its personalities, and its aftermath. 
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process in the international sphere is heavily influenced by domestic public opinion 
(Gause, 2002, p. 2).  It is equally impossible to assess the future of external issues 
without assuming internal stability.  Thus I have chosen to first touch lightly on external 
issues (upon which there is substantial agreement among the writers surveyed) and then 
focus instead on literature relating to the Saudi monarchy, reform movements, the 
Wahhabi religious establishment, and Islamic radicalism within the Kingdom.   
External issues are adequately summarized by the CIA World Factbook 
(CIA, 2005) or any good encyclopedia.  Saudi Arabia is one of the largest and most 
influential nations of the Middle East.  Saudi Arabia is the world’s most important oil 
producer and exporter, and the leading member of OPEC.  It has historically had the 
ability to single-handedly restrain the market price of oil by leveraging its oil reserves.  
This spare capacity, by many reports, is now shrinking as oil prices are surging to match 
global demand.  As the cradle of Islam and the home of Islam’s holiest sites, Saudi 
Arabia has an important role in defining Islam for millions of Muslims worldwide.  In 
exchange for providing the royal family Islamic legitimacy, the official religious 
establishment (a sprawling, state-funded bureaucracy) has traditionally been permitted 
unfettered means to sow the Wahhabi brand of Islam both at home and abroad. 
Religion is a primary example of an external issue being driven by 
domestic issues in Saudi Arabia.  There is a substantial amount of alarmist literature 
which, in the wake of 9/11, vilifies the religious establishment and its influence on the 
education system for producing fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers.  Most major U.S. 
newspapers have promoted such a view, but few writers have done so more elaborately 
than Robert Baer (2003a) in Sleeping With the Devil.  Mr. Baer relies on his experiences 
and contacts as a CIA case officer in the region (although never to Saudi Arabia itself) to 
suggest complicity between the royal family, Al Qaeda, and the religious establishment.  
Less inflammatory writers on the subject do not deny troubling aspects of Wahhabism, 
but observe that within Saudi religious circles there are divisions among those who 
advocate a violent overthrow of the Al Saud to those who support a constitutional 
monarchy based on Islamic law, or sharia.  Gregory Gause is among the most persuasive 
of these writers.  On the most positive end of the spectrum, organizations such as the 
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Saudi-U.S. Relations Information Service emphasize “the characteristics, strength and 
importance of the U.S.-Saudi relationship,” (SUSRIS, 2005) presenting official Saudi and 
U.S. statements claiming increasing and beneficial cooperation in counterterrorism 
efforts since 9/11, as well as the favorable opinions of notables such as Walter Lippman, 
Anthony Cordesman, Brad Borland, Jack Straw, and various Saudi Government 
Ministers. 
A wide variety of opinions is also available regarding royal succession, 
perhaps the most difficult internal issue to ascertain because, “when it comes to family 
politics, "those who know don't talk, and those who talk don't know."”(Gause, 2005).  
Some observers, such as Michael Doran, recall the indecisiveness of official public 
statements after (former) King Fahd’s stroke to suggest major divisions within the royal 
family.  Others, including Gause, note that the problems seem to have been resolved, 
particularly in the aftermath of the 2003 Al Qaeda attacks inside the Kingdom.  Baer 
appears to go high-and-right, perceiving that the royal family is poised to collapse at any 
moment and suggesting that the U.S. might, “at the very least…have to consider seizing 
the oil fields” (2003a, p. xxviii).  While the latter view is extreme, should both King  
Abdullah and his designated successor, Crown Prince Sultan, die at roughly the same 
time and without naming an agreed-upon successor, a costly power struggle could ensue.   
An alarming domestic factor which is not in dispute, however, is that 
Saudi Arabia faces serious demographic challenges.  Its population is burgeoning: it 
ranks 60 of 226 in birth rate, but only 224 of 226 in death rate, ranking in the fastest 20 
percent of growth rates (2.44%, compared with 0.92% in the U.S.) (CIA, 2005).  A vast 
proportion of the population is under the age of 40, an immediate consequence of which 
is an unemployment rate of approximately 25 percent.  Nor is Saudi civil infrastructure 
able to keep pace with population growth.  The negative effects of such sustained patterns 
are currently mitigated by near-record oil prices, but Saudi Arabia’s rentier economy 
makes the government vulnerable to widespread discontent should oil prices plummet or 





c. Islamic Revolutions 
There were numerous violent Islamic movements in the 1970’s and ‘80’s, 
including in prominent Muslim nations such Egypt, Syria, and Iran.  But most are best 
described as coups d’etat. Only in Iran did popular unrest evolve into full-fledged 
revolution and the installation of an Islamic theocracy.  Henry Munson, in Islam and 
Revolution in the Middle East, writes that Iran’s revolution rose from conditions of 
widespread popular discontent, the existing government was crippled, and the presence of 
“opposition forces capable of articulating popular grievances and mobilizing political 
action” (p. ix).  Munson’s analysis leads to perhaps the most significant point, made 
repeatedly in the literature surveyed for this paper: despite the rhetoric, Islamic 
revolutions, whether fomented by radicals and reformers, are essentially political, not 
religious, in nature.  The point is made more directly by Bernard Lewis (1988): 
As the Ayatollah Khomeini has reminded us, Muhammad exercised the 
normal functions of a head of state—he dispensed justice, he raised taxes, 
he promulgated laws, he made war, he made peace. In other words, from 
the very beginning, in the sacred biography of its Prophet, in its earliest 
history enshrined in scripture and tradition, Islam as a religion has been 
associated with the exercise of power. Again to quote Khomeini: "Islam is 
politics or it is nothing. 
The distinction between radicals and reformers is not one of kind, but 
rather of degree, in that both types of movements seek to change the existing political 
order, might be nationalistic or not (Khomeini vs. Pakistan’s Zia al-Haqq in 1977, for 
example), and are often internally divided (Munson, c1988, pp 4-5).  The degree, then, 
refers to the movement’s willingness and propensity to use violence, on one end of the 
spectrum, or to join the political mainstream on the other.   
Revolutionaries, or radicals, and reformers do tend to differ, nevertheless. 
Revolutionaries tend to emphasize foreign domination (a heavily featured complaint in 
pre-revolution Iran), while reformers typically place heavier emphasis on conformity to 
Islamic law.  The former often have vitriolic relations with the United States, while the 
latter often have good relations with America (e.g. Pakistan and Egypt).  Revolutionaries 
tend to be supported by Iran (e.g. Lebanese Hezbollah), and predominantly Shi’a, while 
reformers are more likely to be supported by Sunni Saudi Arabia (Munson, c1988, pp 6).  
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The trends are not mutually exclusive, however—Al Qaeda seems to incorporate themes 
from both ends of the spectrum.  Bin Laden’s rhetoric emphasizes both foreign 
domination (of Islam by the West) and conformity with Islamic law, is rabidly anti-
American yet, according to numerous sources, relies on Saudi financiers and recruits. 
Arjomand addresses Islamic revolution in the context of the Iranian 
experience.  He quotes Crane Brinton to emphasize the point that, “Modern revolutions 
occur not in stagnant societies, but in those undergoing considerable social change” 
(1988, p. 4).  Arjomand also notes that while a number of factors combined to create a 
revolutionary opportunity, the direction of the revolution was determined by Islamic 
ideology (1988, p. 5).   
Applying Jeff Goodwin’s theory in No Other Way Out to the comparison 
of Iran and Saudi Arabia, one comes away with the idea that where Iran experienced a 
radical revolution which fundamentally transformed important institutions of the Iranian 
state (p. 10), Saudi Arabia may well experience a non-radical revolution, a “conservative 
revolutionary movement” which “seeks state power but which also wishes…to preserve 
or at most to moderately reform existing economic social, and cultural arrangements, 
without changing them fundamentally” (p. 11). 
Gary Sick (1993) suggests that, “The absence of vigor and visible progress 
is one of the root causes of the Islamic uprising.  When governments function well, 
radical movements gravitate to the fringes of politics; but when governments are 
perceived as corrupt and inept, drastic solutions become more attractive” (p. 19).   
While there is no consensus on root causes among the literature surveyed on 
Islamic revolutions, there is general agreement that the movements are political in nature, 
but rely on Islam for a compelling ideology.  This agreement will be important when 
examining the opposition structures of Iran and Saudi Arabia in more detail in Chapter II. 
 
2. Compare and Contrast: Bases for Comparison  
Despite possible objections to a comparison of two countries as different as Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, there are four substantial bases for comparing the two: (1) Iran 
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experienced the only full-fledged Islamic revolution; (2) revolution is underpinned by 
social unrest whose sources lend themselves easily to comparison; (3) the two countries 
are/were regional heavyweights and important to U.S. security policy; and (4) a major 
challenge to the ruling regime is/was the question of legitimacy.   
a. Only in Iran   
“There have been several movements called revolutionary in the lands of 
Islam in [the 20th] century,” according to Bernard Lewis (1988, p. 2), but only in Iran was 
it a revolution in the classic sense, “a mass movement with wide popular participation 
that resulted in a major shift in economic as well as political power, and that…continued 
a process of vast social transformation.”  While the current state of Iran may be 
uninspiring to today’s Muslim revolutionaries, elements of the ideology which Khomeini 
employed in 1978-9 still resonate in the Muslim world today, regardless of sectarian 
division.  Moreover, the Iranian case offers the only case in which a charismatic figure 
successfully appealed to and mobilized every stratum of an Islamic society.  UBL has 
stated his intention of overthrowing the Al Saud, using many of the same arguments as 
Khomeini.  So, “Although the Iranian experience cannot be used to predict what might 
happen in other countries, it may provide some useful clues.  Perhaps the most significant 
lesson that can be drawn from Iran’s 14-year experiment is that Islam as a religion 
appears to be less important than Islam as a political virus” (Sick, 1993).   
Secular revolutions outside the Middle East can provide useful insight into 
the social and political revolutionary undercurrents in Saudi Arabia today, but besides 
several examples of coups d’etat, there is not another revolution which contained the 
specifically Muslim symbols and slogans besides the Iranian case.  As Bernard Lewis 
(1988, p. 7) comments, “In fourteen centuries of Islamic history there have been many 
opposition movements within Islam.  Almost all of them and certainly all those of any 
significance were religiously expressed.  Opposition to the prevailing order, criticism of 
an existing regime, found expression in religious terms just as the prevailing regime 
defined its authority and its legitimacy in religious terms.”  Saudi Arabia is today, as was 
the Shah in 1978, confronted with an opponent who bases his determination to overthrow 
the regime on Islam.   
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b. Revolutionary Underpinnings  
The purpose of this thesis, again, is to evaluate Saudi Arabia’s 
susceptibility to revolution.  As previously stated, even revolutions outside the Middle 
East still have some bearing on the current Saudi situation because revolution, whatever 
its religious or ideological bent, is still and always a social and political movement.  Iran 
is no exception, and it is as fair to compare one revolution, Islamic or not, to another as it 
is to compare two football teams, two political parties, or two militaries.    
c. Regional Heavyweights   
It would be unfair to compare Iran in the 1970s with, say, Honduras, or 
even Pakistan, in the context of U.S. interests.  President Nixon had made Iran the 
lynchpin of U.S. security policy in the Middle East (Sick, 1985, pp. 18, 20).  Iran was 
useful to the United States economically, as a regional tension reducer, as a 
counterinsurgency partner (in Oman), as a reliable oil supplier to the West in general, and 
as Israel’s primary source of oil.  Iran also shared a 1,600 mile border with the Soviet 
Union and controlled the Straits of Hormuz, making Iran extremely valuable 
geographically as a strategic ally (Bill, 1988, pp. 16, 17).  Saudi Arabia is at least as 
important to the United State’s interests today as Iran was in the 1970s.  This is 
demonstrable in economic terms, particularly with respect to the stability of the global oil 
market.  The Saudis have provided essential security assistance, providing bases during 
the Gulf War of 1990-91 and throughout the period of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH.  
Saudi Arabia is becoming a more active strategic counterterrorism partner as well 
(although this cooperation has largely coincided with the incidence of terrorism on Saudi 
soil since 2003).  Perhaps the most important point to make with respect to the contextual 
comparability is that the U.S. has provided an international safety net for Saudi Arabia 
for decades.  A similar U.S. commitment to the Shah was ultimately a factor in his 
demise as Khomeini successfully painted the Shah not only as a puppet, but as the Great 
Satan’s puppet.  As Munson (1988, p. 127) argues,  “The aura of invincibility that had 
surrounded the shah, as well as much of the hostility toward him, was due in large part to 
the conviction that he was Washington’s man and that the United States would never 
tolerate his demise.  Once that conviction was shaken, so were the foundations of the 
shah’s regime.”  Munson adds that in the context of the Carter Administration’s fault-
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finding Human Rights policy toward Iran, “If Iranians had not perceived their king to be 
an American puppet, much of their hostility toward him would not have existed, and a 
perceived dilution of American support could not have precipitated his overthrow” (p. 
128).  If the Saudi regime is similarly viewed among Saudis as “Washington’s men”, then 
American criticism of the Al Saud has the potential to undermine the regime’s strength. 
d. Legitimacy   
The Shah made only token efforts to present himself under a mantle of 
Islamic piety, and experienced a crisis of legitimacy as his modernization programs 
began to erode the societal base of his country.  Khomeini successfully stripped him of 
his legitimacy by persuading Iranians that the Shah had lost his Muslim identity and was 
corrupting Iran by non-Muslim behavior.  The Saudi royal family is likewise beginning to 
hear an increasing volume of rhetoric from Islamist opponents about the family’s Islamic 
credentials.  Some princes are well known for their personal moral corruption, and the 
regime as a whole is open to criticism for maintaining economic and political ties with 
the West which violate a narrow interpretation of Islam.  A political principle which 
applies to both Iran and Saudi Arabia is that, “Power seeks legitimacy, and attains it more 
effectively, among Muslims, from Islam rather than from national or patriotic or even 
dynastic claims, still less from the Western notion of national or popular sovereignty” 
(Lewis, 1988, p. 4).   
The preceding factors of legitimacy, the two counties’ strategic 
importance and relationship with the United States, and Iran’s singular experience of 
Islamic revolution combine to justify a comparison of Iranian and Saudi opposition (and 
counter-opposition) structures. 
 
3. Compare and Contrast: Obstacles to Overcome 
While a justifiable base for comparison exists, no two countries are homogenous.  
The basic question at the outset is whether the context in which the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution occurred makes that revolution un-comparable to Saudi Arabia’s current 
situation. What, then, are the difficulties to be addressed in order to plausibly apply the 
Iranian context to the Saudi Arabian?  There are three obvious objections which must be 
overcome in order to begin a credible comparison: (1) Religious difference—most Saudis 
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are Sunni, most Iranians are Shi’i; (2) Ethnic difference—Saudis are Arab, Iranians are 
Persian; and (3) Time difference—The international playing field has changed 
considerably since 1979.  A discussion of these three should reveal not only how the two 
contexts differ, but also what to be mindful of when making a comparison in which 
events that happened in Iran may not be directly applicable to Saudi Arabia.   
a. Religious Differences: Sunni and Shi’a.   
Saudis and Sunnis generally adhere to different Islamic sects: Iranians are 
predominantly Shi’i; Saudis are predominantly Sunni.   Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of 
Islam, and the Saudi royal family is considered to be the custodian of Islam’s most holy 
places, Mecca and Medina.  “The constitution of the kingdom remains the Quran, though 
for all intents and purposes the “basic system” [of government, promulgated by the king 
in 1992] is the functional equivalent of a constitution.  Long before the Iranian 
Revolution…the Saudis have contended that theirs is the model “Islamic State” (Gause, 
1994, p. 29).  Although Shi’ites adhere to the same five pillars of Islam as Sunnis, 
including the hajj to Mecca, Iran’s Shi’i religious hierocracy lays claim to Islamic 
authority and historical importance.  As late as the Constitutional Revolution in 1905 
Iranians held that “the [Iranian] ruler was yet ‘the King of Islam’ and of the Shi’ite 
nation” (Arjomand, 1988, p. 79).  The two views about Islam’s custody are indeed 
incompatible, but Gregory Gause (1994, p. 32) says, “Islam is a contested concept in the 
political realm, as the ideological competition between Saudi Arabia and revolutionary 
Iran demonstrates.”  The question at hand, however, is whether any sectarian differences 
preclude a meaningful comparison of the Iranian and Saudi political contexts. In other 
words, did the Iranian Islamic Revolution occur only because Shi’ites are somehow more 
prone to revolution than Sunnis?   
Three significant differences do exist which pertain to this discussion.  
First, as described by Said Amir Arjomand (1988, p. 75): “The most important feature 
distinguishing Shi’ite from Sunni Islam since the end of the eighteenth century is the 
separation of political and religious authority, and the corresponding autonomy of the 
religious institution from the state.”  This is important because, as Arjomand continues, 
“Modernization and the expansion of the power of the state was, sooner or later, bound to 
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entail restriction of hierocratic power” (p. 77).  In Saudi Arabia the Sunni religious 
establishment is not separate from the government, and so does not compete with the 
monarchy for political authority in the same way as the Iranian hierocracy.  Nevertheless, 
“Movement from the rural periphery into urban centers has…been historically associated 
with increasing religious orthodoxy and a more rigorous adherence to the legalistic and 
puritanical central tradition of Islam” (Gellner, 1981, as quoted by Arjomand, 1988, p. 
91).  Saudi Arabia’s demographic problems (including a burgeoning urban population) 
seem bound to create the kind social disruptions from which Saudis are likely to seek 
relief in Islam unless alternative forms of political expression are introduced.   
Henry Munson (1994, p. 131) identifies the second and third uniquely 
Shi’ite factors upon which Ayatollah Khomeini was able to capitalize.   Second are the 
writings of Dr. Ali Shari’ati (1933 - 1977), the principal theorist of the lift wing of Iran’s 
Islamic movement in the 70’s, emphasized the revolutionary character of Shi’i Islam.  
Thirdly, Khomeini accrued more authority than any Sunni religious leader could expect 
because “most Shi’ites believe [leading Ayatollahs] are the sacred representatives of the 
messianic hidden imam.”  Said Amir Arjomand (1988, p. 99) supports this assertion in 
discussing the ideology that Khomeini developed and spread: “Certain specific features 
of Shi’ite Islam were highly suitable for the mobilization of the masses…Islamic 
government had to be linked in many ways with powerful images.  Such images were 
drawn from the Shi’ite theodicy of suffering…”   
Although these facets of Shi’ism enabled the revolution, it would 
nevertheless be wrong to believe that these factors alone were causal—the Iranian 
example, after all, occurred within a complex socio-political environment.  Moreover, the 
fact that Usama bin Laden, a Sunni, has mobilized support and/or sympathy from 
Muslims around the world using an ideology rich with imagery of “the prophet as 
revolutionary” suggests that either the phenomenon is not uniquely Shi’ite, or that he is 
co-opting elements of Khomeini’s ideology.   
Are Shi’ites therefore inherently more inclined than Sunnis to revolution 
or radicalism?  While both Saudi Arabia and Iran have encouraged Islamic movements 
abroad, “those supported by Saudi Arabia are invariably Sunni as well as non-
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revolutionary” (Munson 1988, p. 6), whereas the movements Iran has supported are not 
only predominantly (but not exclusively) Shi’i but also radical rather than reformist.  But 
while it is clear that Ayatollah Khomeini led a revolutionary movement which 
successfully sought to overthrow the existing form of government in order to establish a 
new order (i.e. a revolution), there were in the movement both Shi’ite reformers and 
radicals.  The point here is that Islamic movements, like most political movements, 
contain elements and sub-groups whose ideologies vary along a spectrum that lies 
between reform and revolution.  The mainstream opposition to the Saudi form of 
government seems to have in mind not a revolution but reforms leading to greater 
political participation and civil liberties within the confines of Islamic law.  Gregory 
Gause (1994, p. 101), a well-known commentator on Gulf and Middle Eastern affairs, 
commenting on Saudi petitions for reform in the early 1990s, says, “none of these 
petitions questioned the basis of the political system…All expressed support for the 
ruling families, even when calling for limits on their powers.  None advocated the kind of 
radical change that Arab nationalist groups called for in past decades…” More than a 
decade after Gause’s comments Saudis are now experiencing a degree of reform with 
municipal elections, but Usama bin Laden and Al Qaeda appear to be simultaneously 
promoting a more revolutionary agenda with support from many Saudi sympathizers.   
Religious themes clearly affect the character and structure of the Islamic 
movements, which will be further explored in Chapter II.  But the Sunni-Shi’a religious 
difference between Saudis and Iranians need not preclude a comparison of the two 
situations.  The differences merely add texture to the comparison of Khomeini’s Iran with 
today’s Saudi Arabia, rather than invalidating it.   
b. Social / Ethnic Differences: Arabs and Persians 
If religion is an insufficient reason to dismiss the comparison, then what 
about ethnicity?  The essential question here is whether there was a factor of the Iranian 
revolution which can be attributed to Persian history, language, culture which would 
render invalid a comparison with an Arab social/political context.  One might leap to the 
conclusion that, since Persians and Arabs have been fighting each other for centuries, and 
since Persians and Arabs use the contemptuous terms “mouse-eaters” and “lizard eaters” 
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to describe each other respectively (Halliday, 1996), their two cultures and socio-political 
contexts make an effective comparison impossible.  Fred Halliday (1996), writing for 
CERI, the French Center for International Studies and Research, records that in fact, 
“Language, religion, pilgrimage, migration, trade have tied the regions of both peoples 
together for all of history.  For much of the time they have lived in peace, not 
war…Within what is today the Arab domains there have always been communities with 
Iranian characteristics…On the Iranian side, script, vocabulary and religion are all of 
Arab origin.”  He goes on to say, “If one ventures into the difficult and often tendentious 
domain of racial characteristics, the situation is clear enough: the faces, physical 
characteristics, body language in Baghdad and Basra differ little if at all from those in 
Tehran and Isfahan.  The ‘we’ and the ‘they’ are not given by history but are the products 
of specific, often conscious, political interventions.”  Clearly, then, there are differences 
between Persians and Arabs, but also an abundance of common ground.  It would 
therefore be naïve to suggest that since the Iranian Islamic Revolution was conducted by 
Persians it has no applicability in an Arabic context. 
c. Different Times: That was Then, This is Now 
The Iranian Islamic Revolution culminated in 1979.  The United States 
and the Soviet Union were vying for dominance around the globe; the power of oil had 
been recently demonstrated in the energy crisis of the late 1970s; Iran led the contest for 
regional dominance among Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia; and President Nixon had vested 
U.S. Cold War security policy vis a vis the Middle East in Iran’s Muhammad Reza Shah 
Pahlavi.  Times have certainly changed: the dominant global contest today is no longer 
between American and Soviet superpowers but rather the so-called Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT); Iraq’s Shi’ites are ascendant while Iran has faded into a pariah state, 
leaving Saudi Arabia as the most powerful (certainly economically, if not militarily) of 
the three rivals; and the U.S. now has a much larger footprint in the Middle East.  Once 
again, the question to be asked is whether any of this precludes a meaningful comparison 
of revolutionary Iran with today’s Saudi Arabia.  A later portion of this paper will go into 
more detail about the similarities and differences between the two contexts, but for now 
suffice to say that if care is taken to acknowledge particular areas of difficulty when 
comparing the two countries, there is no good reason to expect that no observation about 
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the conditions leading up to the Iranian Islamic Revolution can be applied to Saudi 
Arabia’s current situation simply because times have changed.  The same is true of the 
obvious religious and ethnic differences between Saudi Arabia and Iran, especially 
keeping in mind that the focus of this paper is on the structure of the opposition. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
To summarize this chapter, the principle objective of this study was to determine 
whether, as some vocal commentators declare, Saudi Arabia is under the kind of threat 
which resulted in the dramatic overthrow of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi during the 
Iranian Islamic Revolution.  Lessons from the latter may be applied to Saudi Arabia 
today in order first to understand the respective Saudi and Iranian political contexts, and 
then to prevent the possibility of an Islamic revolution in Saudi Arabia from taking the 
United States by surprise.  To arrive at my conclusion that the Saudi ruling family, given 
its strong integration with Saudi society, is not vulnerable in the near term to an Iranian-
style revolt, I began by acknowledging and overcome the obvious sectarian, ethnic, and 
timeframe differences between the two situations.  I then establish that they are 
nevertheless comparable.  In Chapter II I proceed with a detailed comparison of the 
structures of the Iranian and Saudi opposition, and in Chapter III I conduct a similar 
comparison of the respective regime structures.   
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II. THE OPPOSITION 
This chapter describes the Iranian opposition to Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi’s 
regime, and compares it with the opposition in Saudi Arabia today in order to determine 
whether any of the disparate social and/or political forces and organizations in Saudi 
Arabia present a similar threat to the Al Saud, and if not, to assess whether there is a 
discernible ideology, personality, or cause around which the Saudi opposition might 
coalesce into a force capable of mounting a true threat to the Al Saud. Bernard Lewis, a 
respected Middle East historian, writes:  
In fourteen centuries of Islamic history there have been many opposition 
movements within Islam.  Almost all of them and certainly all those of any 
significance were religiously expressed.  Opposition to the prevailing 
order, criticism of an existing regime, found expression in religious terms 
just as the prevailing regime defined its authority and its legitimacy in 
religious terms.  To confront a religious regime, one needed a religious 
challenge (Lewis, 1988, p. 7). 
Iranian population’s grievances against the shah, both sociocultural and 
materialistic, were indeed cloaked in the language and symbols of Islam.  In Saudi 
Arabia, likewise, Islamic rhetoric and the expression of material grievances are 
indistinguishable.  It is my intent herein to demonstrate that the Iranian opposition was 
well integrated with Iranians through well established, but informal, urban networks.  
These networks were the channels through which Khomeini orchestrated the Islamic 
Revolution against the Shah’s regime.  Little is known (or at least published) about 
informal urban networks in Saudi Arabia—a significant finding in itself.  What is known, 
however, is that the Saudi opposition is fragmented among loyal reformists and violent 
jihadists.  The latter, although receiving the most media attention, are only weakly 
integrated with society and are marginalized among ordinary Saudis.  I analyze both 
scenarios (without ignoring the social, political, and religious contexts) in terms of the 
formal and informal organizational structures within which the respective opposition 
movements and regimes act(ed). 
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A. THE IRANIAN OPPOSITION  
The Shah negated formal political organizations opposed to his regime using 
modern instruments of the state (SAVAK, the bureaucracy, and the army) but neglected 
to forge connections between his regime and informal power centers.  The shah was thus 
unable to suppress the forces for change which found expression through informal 
networks.  Fred Halliday (1979, p. 212), writing in 1978 as the Iranian Revolution neared 
its climax, distinguished between opposition forces, and opposition organizations, 
writing that while the motivations of the various demonstrators were diverse, “the 
strength and activity of opposition organizations in Iran must under existing conditions 
be rather small, but, as 1978 showed, the grounds for opposition, and hence the 
opposition forces that exist fermenting below the surface, are very large.”  It should be 
noted here that implicit with the notion of opposition forces is some form of organization, 
but in an authoritarian regime this organization tends to be informal, not institutionalized 
in political parties, unions, or other formal political organizations. 
A brief mention of the formal Iranian opposition organizations, however weak 
they may have been, is warranted here.  Three groupings existed in Iran: National groups, 
guerrilla groups, and traditional opposition organizations.  National groups such as the 
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, the Front for the Liberation of the Arab areas of Iran, 
the Revolutionary Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Arabestan, and the 
Baluchistan People’s League had petitioned or fought the government for either 
independence or autonomy, but by 1978 none were a credible threat to the regime, nor 
capable of organizing larger scale opposition (Halliday, 1979, pp. 226-27).   
Guerrilla groups, the Organization of the Iranian People’s Fedayin Guerrillas, and 
Organization of the People’s Combatants (commonly known as the Mojahedin-e Khalq 
and ‘the Fedayin’ respectively) were not influential in the 1978 movement because they 
“operated under conditions of extreme clandestineness and difficulty.  Neither 
organization had any ties to existing mass political organizations when they began, and it 
has not proved possible for them to build any such organizations… the guerrillas have 
remained virtually isolated from the population in whose name they claim to be acting”  
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(Halliday, 1979, pp. 236-39).  Individual members of both organizations almost certainly 
participated in the riots and demonstrations, but there was not a significant organizational 
contribution.   
Traditional opposition organizations in 1978 were limited to the National Front 
and the Tudeh Party.  The National Front, whose main demand was the restoration of 
constitutional government, could not easily provide the basis for real opposition because 
it was “never a proper political organization, but was rather a coalition of different 
factions within the parliament, [nor did it have] the organizational capacity to survive 
under conditions of dictatorship” (Halliday, 1979, p. 226).  Tudeh, the Iranian communist 
party, was much more organized, but was popularly perceived as Moscow’s toady.  
Worse, since it was thoroughly penetrated by SAVAK and its leaders operated from 
exile, the party suffered the “widespread belief that Tudeh was an unreliable section of 
the opposition...[and] the most common accusation is that the Tudeh leadership are 
‘traitors’ because they have left Iran” (Halliday, 1979, p. 232).  This explains the 
weakness of Iranian opposition organizations, but how does one explain the manifestation 
of the latent power of the opposition forces as 1978 progressed?  Clearly hundreds of 
thousands of demonstrators do not spontaneously appear in a city’s streets—there must 
be some organization, if not orchestration, which directs the passions of an aroused 
populace.   
The structure of the Iranian opposition as the revolution gained momentum in 
1978 was difficult for both foreigners and Iranians to clearly identify or explain: “…most 
observers and many participants did not make much headway in comprehending the 
unfolding revolution in Iran, a revolution that was neither “bourgeois” nor “proletarian” 
and whose slogans emphasized neither democracy nor progress…” (Arjomand, 1988, p. 
4).  Additionally, it was not at all clear at the time that Khomeini and the clerics would, 
or even could, be the key actors in harnessing the disparate social forces.  Gary Sick 
(1985) recalls that the outcome of the disturbances in 1978 was never as inevitable as it 
now seems—the Shah was in command of a large army, a substantial treasury, and a 
legendary secret police (SAVAK); had powerful friends abroad; and had weathered 
similar-appearing crises before during his thirty-seven years in power.  The opposition, 
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on the other hand, was “an aged cleric who had fulminated against the shah from exile for 
14 years to no avail and a congeries of aging Mosaddeghists, village ecclesiastics and 
disgruntled job seekers” (Sick, 1985, p. 41).  The following paragraphs will show that the 
Shah was indeed well equipped to control formal opposition groups, but that he 
misjudged the source of true opposition force—the informal urban networks manipulated 
by Khomeini’s associates—over which the shah had no control.   
Even if the nature of the opposition movement had been apparent, the repressive 
nature of the Iranian regime made it difficult at the time to discern a clear picture of the 
opposition, “As with so much else in Iran, it is not only that there may be much that we 
do not hear about; it may also be that what we do hear about as having happened never 
did so, or at least not in the way it is claimed” (Halliday, 1979, p. 212).  Nevertheless, 
Halliday went on to observe that by 1978, “a vocal and sustained opposition became 
evident, with protests by writers, lawyers and politicians about restrictions on freedom, 
widespread student demonstrations on campuses, and in March 1978 a prolonged hunger 
strike by political prisoners in Evin jail.  Beyond these incidents there unfolded a mass 
opposition in over thirty towns.”   
The informal networks in which opposition forces found their loudest voice were 
a specifically urban phenomenon.  Although the rural poor and nomads had historically 
presented occasional problems for the Shah’s regime, by 1978 they were a negligible 
factor.  The rural poor had anyway been becoming the urban poor throughout the 1970s, 
due to massive rural-urban migration.  Nomads, likewise, had decreased to only five 
percent of the Iranian population.  Groups of Kurdish, Arab, and Baluchi nationalities 
also overlapped with the rural poor and nomads, and were not an independent opposition 
force of consequence.  The rural poor, according to Halliday (1979, pp. 213, 214), 
assumed a passive form of opposition and remained “relatively isolated from other 
political influences.”  The outside influences to which the rural poor were subjected 
tended to be those chosen by the state.   
The urban poor, on the other hand, were a large and critical component of the 
informal networks to be discussed below, and thus became, eventually, a potent political 
force.  As Halliday (1979, pp. 297-8) surveyed the Iranian political scene in late 1978, he 
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concluded that, “The most important question concerns the character of the hundreds of 
thousands of people who demonstrated in Tehran and other cities.  These were the urban 
poor…They were joined in their protests by the merchants of the bazaar, who were 
traditionally close to the mosque…[The movement] was not in any proper sense of the 
word ‘religious’.  Its complaints and demands were eminently materialist.  But it did 
follow the religious leaders and phrase some of its demands in an Islamic form for want 
of any other alternative.”5  This observation suggests the importance of the bazaar and 
the mosque in explaining the earlier question of how the potential opposition forces 
became manifest.  The organizational power of the bazaar and mosque is addressed in an 
excellent study of informal urban networks in the Middle East by Guilain Denoeux, upon 
which I will rely heavily to describe the real power of the Iranian opposition.  From there 
I proceed to apply Denoeux’s ideas about the ability of urban networks to either stabilize 
or destabilize a regime to the current Saudi situation explain. 
By the 1970s, formal Iranian opposition organizations had been effectively 
repressed by the Shah, so that “on the eve of the revolution, while there was considerable 
hatred of the shah, there also existed no formally organized group in a position to 
challenge his regime” (Denoeux, 1993, p. 90).  The Iranian opposition must, therefore, 
have been informal.  Denoeux explains further that informal networks are an enduring 
characteristic of the Middle East’s authoritarian regimes: “[I]nformal networks remain 
potent bases from which to organize political dissent...because the absence of formal 
channels to express opposition to the government often has turned informally organized 
associations into the most readily available vehicles for the airing of grievances.”  And, 
“even when [formal organizations] have been allowed, their ability to recruit and 
mobilize has been seriously impeded by the state’s ability to coopt or coerce social forces 
                                                 
5 Some would argue with Halliday over the importance of true religious feeling to the success of the 
revolution.  Denoeux (p.208) agrees that “…Islam has sometimes provided the ready-made ideology that 
has been able to unify a multiplicity of informal networks—even, once again, when these groups originally 
appeared as a result of concerns and forces that are neither religious nor specific to Arab-Muslim culture 
(e.g., the quest for identity and cultural authenticity, the resentment of foreign domination and Western 
cultural influences…),” but emphasizes that “Khomeini and the militant ulama grouped around him were 
primarily concerned with the preservation of the cultural and moral foundations of the traditional order.  
They wanted first and foremost to preserve the Islamic character of Islamic society, under a state that 
would publicly acknowledge the contribution of clerics and religion to a healthy society and try to uphold 
the social status of the ulama as the official guardians of the Shi’ite traditions” (Tabari, as referenced by 
Denoeux, p.181). 
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through the distribution of patronage and the threat to use force.”  How, then, does one 
describe Iran’s informal networks, especially their mobilization during the revolution? 
Using Denoeux’s definition, a network refers to “groups of individuals linked to 
one another by highly personal, non-contractual bonds and loyalties” (p. 3).  Denoeux 
identifies two (overlapping) types of informal networks.  Patron-Client, or clientelist, 
networks entail informal ties from ruling elites to the population via intermediaries such 
as ulama6, bazaaris7, leaders of urban quarters and Sufi orders—these networks provide 
important channels of communication between the regime and the population.  The 
second type of informal network is independent of the governing elite, consisting of 
voluntary associations based on quarter, kinship, religious, and occupational affiliations 
(Denoeux, 1993, p. 34).   
A patron in a clientelist network is one who acts as a broker and/or mediator 
between the regime and the population.  Patrons have some standing in a given segment 
of the population, and deliver that population’s cooperation to the ruling elites in 
exchange for power, position, or money.  These clientelist networks usually promote 
stability for two reasons.  First, everyone benefits: the regime controls the population, the 
patron earns position or money, and the clients receive protection from outside forces, an 
avenue to express grievances, and civil services.  Second, the regime maintains a 
monopoly of force, and both patrons and clients are aware that the regime will not 
hesitate to crack down if threatened (Denoeux, p. 36).   This suggests limits on 
clientelism’s utility in ensuring civil order.  Denoeux notes that there were always 
marginalized elements of the population over whom patrons had no control or influence.  
Central authorities were also sometimes unable to respond appropriately to the legitimate 
demands or protests of clients, either because protest via the notables was too 
cumbersome to solve urgent protests, or because the central authority was too weak or 
divided to respond to the demand (Denoeux, pp. 50, 53).   
Clientelist networks have a long history in Iran.  The Qajar dynasty controlled 
urban populations in nineteenth century Iran by relying on key individuals, known as 
                                                 
6Ulama translates roughly to “Islamic religious leaders” collectively. 
7 Bazaari translates roughly to “wealthy merchants” 
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“notables”: judges, Friday prayer leaders, presidents of the religious courts and chief 
religious officials of the cities, ‘mayors’, guild leaders, district leaders.  One can observe 
in the preceding list of typical patrons the overlap between clientelist networks and 
occupational, religious, and residential networks.  The Qajars, ruling into the early 
twentieth century with a weaker central government, had neither a standing army nor a 
large administrative bureaucracy upon which to base its power.  It relied instead “on the 
readiness of the magnates, the ulama…the judges, and the guild masters to enforce the 
shah’s will, and the disposition of the subjects to submit to his authority…Whole 
livelihoods depended on the gifts, pensions, jobs, offices, and salaries upon which the 
network of Qajar patronage rested” (Abrahamian, as quoted by Denoeux, 1993, p. 39).  
By the 1950s the modernization of Iran under the first Pahlavi shah had created in Iranian 
cities a new social strata—the modern middle class, the intelligentsia, and the industrial 
working class.  Mass-based political parties and unions became “the primary vehicles for 
the political mobilization of these new…segments of the Iranian population” (Denoeux, 
p. 89).  But, as previously stated, by the 1970s these political bodies were repressed, 
controlled, or co-opted by the state, leaving informal networks as the sole vehicle for 
political expression for ordinary Iranians.  These informal networks, however, proved not 
always to be stabilizing mechanisms.   
Denoeux (p. 53) discerns three conditions under which networks typically become 
destabilizing.  First, if a weakening (by internal division, military defeat, policy failure, 
etc.) regime is no longer able to keep its end of the bargain by providing favors to the 
patrons and security to the population, the regime becomes an unattractive partner for the 
notables.  This effect is magnified where notables have independent resources.  Second, 
clients will exert pressure on local leaders to become involved on their side if the 
government threatens the interests of substantial segments of the urban population.  
Third, informal urban networks can quickly become destabilizing if the notables 
themselves feel their interests and powers threatened by a regime’s policies or “the 
emergence of alternative sources of patronage that threatened to attract their clienteles.”  
In the 1960s and 1970s the shah introduced well intentioned policies aimed at 
modernizing Iran, but which threatened both the material and cultural interests of large 
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portions of Iran’s rapidly growing urban population, and simultaneously curbed the 
traditional interest and powers of Iran’s clientelist brokers, the Shi’ite clerics and the 
bazaaris.   
Before expanding on revolutionary Iran’s informal urban networks, the role of 
residential networks to the Iranian revolution should be briefly mentioned.  Prior to the 
explosive urban growth in Iran in the latter half of the twentieth century, Iranian cities 
(like other Middle Eastern cities) were informally segregated in quarters based on shared 
ethnic or religious identity.  Within these myriad quarters neighborhood solidarities 
naturally developed and the government appointed informal leaders who acted in many 
ways as agents of the state.  Solidarities engaged in welfare and civic activities within 
their residential quarter and mobilized to defend their interests against other quarters.  
With the growth of the bureaucratic state, however, “government agencies now perform 
such tasks as the resolution of disputes, the maintenance of law and order, the levying of 
taxes, and the management of public services, which once were fulfilled by informal 
leaders of quarters,…by quarter-based youth groups,…or by other informally organized 
associations based on residential affiliations” (Denoeux, p. 69).  Thus, while some 
remnant of the residential network remained by the late 1970s, these affiliations paled in 
significance compared to the informal networks of the intelligentsia, mosque, and bazaar. 
 
1. Bazaar Network   
The Iranian bazaar was capable of acting as an opposition force because it was a 
self-contained community in which shared interests and interpersonal bonds fostered a 
strong sense of collective identity.  This was a stabilizing force for the hundreds of 
thousands of rural migrants, but also a potentially (and eventually) destabilizing force 
when the bazaar’s collective identity and shared interests were threatened. 
A description of the typical Iranian bazaar is helpful for understanding how the 
bazaar network could possibly be a major factor in a political opposition movement.  
The bazaar has always been a pillar of civic foundations. No town could 
survive without a bazaar—whether big or small. Some have…described 
[the] bazaar as the economic heartbeat of the Iranian cities.  The ancient 
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Iranian bazaars have gradually evolved into an encompassing section of 
the town. A bazaar was not a secluded section of the town, but home to…a 
central emporium surrounded by several smaller bazaars and arcades 
(ICCIM, 2005). 
Furthermore, “the cultural and social aspects of the bazaar support the smooth 
transmission of information within the bazaar. The restaurants, tea houses, gymnasiums, 
and bathhouses are places in the bazaar where people meet and exchange information. 
The bazaar population participates in socio-religious events and festivals and the social 
aspects of the bazaar are particularly apparent in the joint prayers of traders in mosques, 
many of which are in or near the bazaar. In addition to daily prayer, the bazaar 
community participates in the weekly religious gatherings. The social and cultural aspects 
of the bazaar form the basis for the mass communication networks. “It is through these 
interpersonal networks and the participation of the same individuals in several different 
gathering during the week that bazaar information, ideas, and rumors are passed on 
(Thaiss, 1971, 189)”” (Gahadassi, 2005).  The bazaar network fostered what Denoeux (p. 
141) calls a distinct subculture, characterized by, “the existence of dense and overlapping 
social networks within the bazaar [and also] norms, habits, values, codes of behavior, and 
rules of conduct specific to the bazaar.”   
The bazaar community was nevertheless stratified, containing an upper class of 
big merchants and money lenders, followed by a tier of wholesalers and middle-rank 
merchants, “followed by the smaller shopkeepers and craftsmen, who formed the 
majority of the bazaari community.  Below the shopkeepers and independent craftsmen, 
the lower echelons of the bazaar were represented by wager earners…followed by those, 
at the very bottom of the bazaari hierarchy, who were engaged [as] carwashers, peddlers, 
street vendors, hawkers, and the like” (Denoeux, pp. 139-40).  The bazaar was not 
politically homogenous either.  Loyalties varied, with a minority of the upper stratum 
supporting the regime, a larger minority backing the radical lower clergy, and the 
majority with either no political allegiance, ties to the National Front, or associated with 
the moderate higher clergy (Denoeux, p. 140).  The bazaar community nevertheless 
“continued to share a sense of collective identity.  What defines a bazaari, in fact, is not 
only his physical location in the bazaar, but also his membership in a distinct community 
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of like-minded individuals bent on preserving the bazaar’s relative independence and 
autonomy against encroachment by outside forces.  Perhaps more than any other factors, 
it is this sense of collective identity that has enabled the bazaaris to transcend their 
divisions at critical junctures” (Denoeux, p. 140).  The bazaar thus maintained its 
coherence as a political force despite these divisions and the trials of modernization.   
Prior to the bulk of the shah’s modernization efforts, leading bazaaris acted as 
patrons, providing a stabilizing link between the ruling elite and the lower classes in the 
bazaar community.  This role was diminished as the physical expansion of Iranian cities 
and modern industry brought the central government and the bazaar into conflict.  Mass-
produced goods and imports, which were sold outside the bazaar in new shops outside the 
bazaar, reduced the bazaar’s relative power.  These new shops and products were popular 
with the new middle class, but the bazaar was still “dominant in retail trade, handicraft 
production, and small-scale manufacturing” and remained “the prime shopping area and a 
vital arena of sociability for the lower- and middle-classes” (Denoeux, pp. 138-9).  
Modernization also witnessed various attempts by the regime to destroy the physical 
integrity of the bazaars with construction or road building8 projects.  The bazaar retained 
its communal strength for several reasons.  First, the shah had repressed leftist 
organizations who might have taken advantage of the social and political differences 
within the community.  Second, every stratum and group had an economic stake in the 
bazaar’s survival as an institution.  Third, the very proximity of bazaaris to one another 
produced not only friction but also an intimate unity against perceived outsiders.  The 
physical separation of the bazaar from urban society reinforced this “us vs. them” 
attitude.  Finally, interpersonal bonds cut across all political, social, and income strata. 
These cross-cutting ties facilitated communication which occurred informally through 
shared membership in guilds, brotherhoods, gymnasiums, and Sufi houses of worship.  
“Restaurants, coffeehouses and teahouses functioned as meeting places and informal 
headquarters…” (Denoeux, p. 141).  Thus, despite the challenges of rapid urbanization 
and modernization to the bazaar’s sustained significance a substantial amount of 
                                                 
8 The bazaar of Mashhad was razed to create a green space, and plans were announced to bisect the 
main bazaar in Tehran to make room for a freeway (Munson, p.116, Denoeux, p.146). 
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commercial activity continued to pass through channels controlled by bazaaris, and the 
bazaar remained one of Iran’s largest employers (Denoeux, p. 139).   
The enduring importance of the bazaar meant also that the cross-cutting lines of 
communication remained largely intact.  Whereas the destabilizing aspect of the network 
in earlier times had occasionally manifested itself through simple collective activity such 
as temporarily shutting down the bazaar to protest government decisions perceived as 
arbitrary or harmful to bazaaris’ interests, the same commercial networks and contacts 
later provided lines of communication which aided coordination and organization of the 
massive demonstrations which eventually transformed Iran’s informal religious networks 
into the revolutionary government of the Islamic Republic.   
The facts of the bazaar’s interconnectedness, collective identity, and political 
force seem clear.  The actual social mechanisms which brought the fact about, though, 
have not yet been detailed here.  Patronage ties existed within the bazaar, expressed, for 
example, by an upper level bazaari lending money to smaller shopkeepers and craftsmen.  
Similarly, the hawkers and carwashers in the outer orbits of the bazaar owed their 
livelihood to it and were easily mobilized to defend the interests of ranking bazaaris.  
Merchants and guild leaders also gathered at noon and in the early evening at the main 
bazaar mosque for congregational prayers, which provided an opportunity to trade 
rumors, news, and opinions.   
The most significant collective activity, however, was perhaps the weekly 
informal religious gatherings referenced earlier by Gahadassi, known as hay’at-e senifs.  
These ulama-led meetings promoted a sense of solidarity in various ways. These 
meetings frequently became the scene for bazaaris to decide ways to assist a colleague in 
financial distress.  Members who would normally compete against each other with 
similar trades or shops found common ground in the meetings.   
Hay’at-e senifs also brought together members of all social classes, creating 
channels for communication and patronage through which well-off merchants could 
“exert some control and influence over younger, more restive, lower-class bazaaris” 
(Denoeux, pp. 142-43).  Furthermore, the meetings conveyed a great deal of political 
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information, at great speed, into which the central government could not easily tap 
because of the meetings’ informal nature.  The meetings also enhanced the group’s 
collective identity in religious terms, and the leadership of a given group’s cleric 
strengthened the bazaar-mosque connection which was so important to the Iranian 
revolution.  Funds collected at the hay’at-e senifs enabled the influence of the bazaari 
community to be felt in the greater community through charitable and civic contributions.  
This benevolence also created a basis for patron-client relationships between members of 
the bazaar and the urban poor, which enabled the bazaar to mobilize huge crowds to 
defend the bazaar’s interests (Denoeux, pp. 142-44). 
It is important to point out that the bazaar’s opposition to the shah’s regime was 
defensive in nature.  Chapter III will discuss this in more detail from the regime’s 
perspective, but at this point it is sufficient to refer again to Denoeux (p. 148), who 
records that “political and cultural factors, and not economic ones, played the 
determining role.  It was an attempt by a substantially unified community to demonstrate 
and reassert its power and influence vis-à-vis a modernizing state whose policies were 
increasingly perceived as arbitrary, insulting, and harmful to both the material interests of 
the bazaar and the Islamic nature of Iranian society.”  It is the Islamic nature of Iranian 
society, and the religious networks controlled by the Shi’ite clerics, to which this chapter 
now turns. 
 
2. Religious Network 
The discussion which follows describes the mosque network in general, its 
connection with the intelligentsia, bazaar, and urban poor, and concludes with a 
description of the network which Khomeini so successfully employed. Denoeux 
identifies two types of religious networks: Double-edged, and Radical-Utopian.  Double-
edged networks can have either a stabilizing or destabilizing effect on the political 
system, radical-utopian networks “always have a destabilizing impact on the 




groups of committed activists” (p. 172).  While the general Iranian mosque network (like 
the bazaar network) was double-edged, the Khomeini network under the shah was 
radical-utopian.   
a. The Mosque Network  
The prominent position of religious networks as a form or political 
opposition owes much to the dominant role of Islam in Iranian society.  Arjomand (p. 5) 
goes so far as to say that, “Islamic ideology, which has determined the direction of the 
Iranian revolution…could not have succeeded without the unusual institutional assets of 
its proponents, the Shi’ite men of religion.  The story of the Islamic revolution in Iran 
must therefore begin with the establishment of Shi’ism as the state religion in 1501 [and 
includes] the consolidation of Shi’ite clerical power and the prevalence of a dual system 
of authority until the onset of centralization and the expansion of the power of the state.”  
The dual system of authority to which Arjomand refers consists of the Iranian state and 
what he terms the hierocracy9 as the two institutions of legitimate authority, including the 
inevitable rivalry between the two for the loyalty of the Iranian people.  More 
importantly, the dual system or authority meant that the Shi’ite hierocracy was virtually 
autonomous.  (Arjomand foreshadows a later chapter of this paper when he writes, “The 
most important feature distinguishing Shi’ite from Sunni Islam since the end of the 
eighteenth century is the separation of political and religious authority, and the 
corresponding autonomy of the religious institution from the state” (p. 75)).  The 
significance of the hierocracy’s autonomy should not be underestimated: “…the degree 
of autonomy and disembedment of a leading social stratum—an elite—to the generation 
of revolutionary social change.  Such autonomy facilitates development of coalitions with 
broader groups, and tends to result in far-reaching restructuring of social institutions.  
The disengagement of the Shi’ite hierocracy from the Pahlavi regime, the increased 
homogeneity of the ‘ulama as an estate (status group), and the sharpened distinctness of 
their identity from secular intelligentsia go a long way toward explaining how they came 
to lead the first successful traditionalist revolution in modern history” (Eisenstadt, as  
 
                                                 
9 Arjomand employs this technical term to refer to “the Shi’ite religious institution.  Neither “clergy” 
nor “church” [conveys] the requisite sense of a system of authority” (p.7). 
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quoted by Arjomand, p. 83).  The term hierocracy may seem to imply hierarchy, but the 
organization of the Shi’ite institution prior to the revolution was in fact highly 
decentralized. 
Arjomand comments on the hierocracy’s organization: “there was no 
formal hierarchy of authority among the mojtaheds, and the congeries of clerics at the 
lower ranks could be differentiated only by the patronage of different mojtaheds and by a 
nonformalized scale of prestige and learning” (p. 14).  There was no papal equivalent to 
confer status and position on the religious elite—these came only through the consensus 
of a community’s elite (Denoeux, p. 164).   The hierocracy was not only independent 
from the state and loosely organized, but around the most senior ayatollahs10 were 
formed extensive networks of personal contacts and reciprocal exchange among the 
various levels of the hierocracy, and thereby throughout urban Iranian society.  These 
networks, as Denoeux notes, were “organizationally, financially, and ideologically 
independent of one another” (p. 163).  This was crucial for Khomeini because, as a 
relatively marginal figure in the 1960s (because of his militancy), he was nevertheless 
able to build such a large following that even  senior, moderate clerics submitted to his 
leadership and its radical implications as the revolution gained momentum. 
The marja’11  network was financially supported through the payment of 
religious dues (over which the government had little or no control), which the ayatollah 
redistributed as a form of patronage to seminary students, charitable causes, and the 
upkeep of his network.  Such a network typically consisted of a core group of several 
hundred devoted former students who were themselves in charge of a large number of 
mosques and religious centers for debating and propagating the faith, each with its own 
substantial congregation (Denoeux, p. 162).  These students typically enjoyed a collective 
identity fostered by shared experiences in their rigorous, ascetic religious training 
facilities.  Friendships and loyalties established during these formative times cut across 
national, social, and ethnic boundaries.  As in the bazaar network, these cross-cutting ties 
                                                 
10 Six senior ayatollahs, including Khomeini, are generally acknowledged to have existed in the mid-
1970s. 
11 Marja-i taqlid translates “source of imitation,” and refers to an ayatollah who developed a 
substantial following (Denoeux, p.163; Arjomand, p. 16) 
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were a critical ingredient in the power of the informal religious networks.  Denoeux says, 
“the religious establishment’s amorphous organization under Muhammad Reza Shah was 
the informal foundation of its power in Iranian society at large….As a result [of the 
separation between the state and the religious establishment] the ulama’s influence had 
come to lie first and foremost in the strength of their relations with the population” (p. 
166).  The clerics’ integration with society enabled them to vocalize (and capitalize on) 
widely held grievances against the shah in the 1970s, especially those grievances which 
seemed to threaten the culture and Islamic integrity of most Iranians (Denoeux, pp. 166-
68). 
The most effective channels through which the population conveyed their 
grievances to the clerics, and through which the clerics in turn influenced the population, 
were informal meetings and associations.  In the early 1970s, Arjomand (p. 92) observed, 
“religious groups mushroomed.”  Arjomand (p. 91) references Gellner in explaining the 
phenomenon: “Movement from the rural periphery into urban centers has thus been 
historically associated with increasing religious orthodoxy and a more rigorous adherence 
to the legalistic and puritanical central tradition of Islam.”  Halliday elaborates, 
attributing the rise in religious activity to “resistance to western and official values, partly 
in response to the abrupt social changes of recent years, and partly in support of the 
mosque as the one institution completely independent of the state” (1979, pp. 18-19).  
The venue for such meetings (mosques, shrines, houses of leading religious figures) 
being sacred places, provided safe havens for the expression of popular discontent.  
Denoeux remarks that “Networks built around Islamic places, institutions, and personnel 
offered the organizational resources, the political entrepreneurs, and the followings 
without which collective action is impossible” (p. 47).   
Sufi orders12 were historically the most important of a group of informally 
organized religious circles, sectarian groups, and religious brotherhoods through which 
                                                 
12 Sufi Islam exists in both Sunni and Shia traditions and has three distinct meanings: 1) mystical, 
spiritual aspect of Islam; 2) popular practice of Islam separate from the Koran and Sunna; 3) Sufi 
brotherhoods, which are cultural/political organizations (Robinson, 2005a).  The latter were characterized 
by organization which relied primarily on personal ties; devotion to a religious master; intense loyalty to 
worldwide members of the same brotherhood; a group experience which brought together all strata of 
society and provided a refuge from the chaos and alienation produced by rapid urbanization; and fulfillment 
of many charitable, educational, administrative, legal and economic functions (Denoeux, p.39-40).   
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religious solidarity were historically expressed.  The earlier description of the bazaar 
network noted the importance of religion in binding together members of the bazaar as a 
whole, particularly within hay’at-e senifs.  Similar groupings and connections existed 
among three critical segments of 1970s Iranian society: the urban poor, the intelligentsia, 
and the bazaar.   
b. The Mosque and the Urban Poor  
Within the overall mosque network a patron-client relationship existed, the 
backbone of which featured informal Shi’ite religious meetings, known as hay’ats13.  The 
typical leader of such a group was a low-ranking cleric, who “provided psychological and 
social support and welfare services.  In return, the clerics could expect a certain degree of 
respect and political loyalty on the part of Iran’s urban masses” (Kazemi, as quoted by 
Denoeux, p. 157).  The hay’ats were composed of some thirty members and formed 
around regional, ethnic, or workplace contact.  Although they were not attended by a 
majority of the urban poor, they were politically significant for three reasons.  First, the 
meetings were the “only voluntary associations independent of the government found 
among the urban poor…prior to the revolution” (Denoeux, p. 157).  Second, the 
interaction between the clerics and group members created durable lines of 
communication and a sense of solidarity between the hierocracy and the urban poor, as 
well as among the attendees themselves.  Third is the aforementioned patronage function 
of the cleric, distributing food, clothing, and other necessities to the poor, thereby 
exerting an influence beyond the small membership of the hay’at.  These meetings 
generally provided a stabilizing influence to the proliferating population of rural 
migrants, but their destabilizing quality was also unmistakable: “The vitality of 
traditional sentiment among the recent migrants into cities made them receptive to the 
propaganda of the traditionalist preachers and pamphleteers.  These groups remained 
marginal and excluded from political processes until the early days of 1978, when with 
dramatic suddenness they were massively mobilized against the Pahlavi regime by 
Khomeini’s traditionalist party” (Arjomand, p. 96).   
                                                 
13 Not to be confused with hay’at-e senifs, which, although similar, took place in the bazaar, among 
bazaaris.  Hay’ats were typically attended by the urban poor, and  “were less structured and more recent 
than the hay’at-e senifs of the bazaar...[they] met in members’ homes, not in the mosque” (Denoeux, 1988, 
p. 157) 
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Under the influence of a Shi’ite establishment with its back to the wall in 
late 1978, the urban poor, mobilized through the hay’ats provided the revolution with the 
majority of both its foot soldiers and martyrs: 
Of the angry, they were the angriest.  They created neither the strategy nor 
the ideology of the revolution, and their opposition alone would never 
have cowed the regime.  But they contributed the gigantic numbers before 
which the will of the government and the army collapsed.  The mullahs, 
who had telephones, knew whom to contact to bring out the masses 
without telephones; many of those who marched came as members of their 
hay’ats.  And many felt that they had internalized the fearless spirit of 
Hosain (Mottahedeh, as referenced by Denoeux, p. 159). 
The power of informal networks in opposition to a regime was clearly 
demonstrated by the urban poor, and was equally evident among the Iranian 
intelligentsia, who started the revolution. 
c. The Mosque and the Intelligentsia   
The place of students and intellectuals in Iran was uneasy.  Although 
students comprised the most consistent and vocal opposition to the shah’s dictatorship, 
the regime afforded them very little space for political expression.  The intellectual class 
perceived the official culture of the Pahlavis to be distasteful, disparaging the shah’s 
national mythology as a militaristic, chauvinistic fabrication.  They viewed the growing 
urban middle class and its western materialism with equal disdain (Halliday, p. 221).  But 
the shah was compelled to expand higher education because his modernization efforts 
necessitated an educated workforce.  The deepening of western influence that 
accompanied Iranian modernization, however, created a correspondingly deep sense of 
cultural alienation among Iranian intellectuals.  “Whereas earlier generations of Iranian 
intellectuals had been concerned primarily with finding ways to modernize the country, 
many educated Iranians in the 1960s and 1970s became obsessed with maintaining the 
moral and cultural fabric of Iranian society.  The search for progress had given way to a 
quest for authenticity and roots; the preoccupation with overcoming backwardness had 
been replaced with a fear of moral decay and the loss of cultural identity” (Denoeux, p. 
160).  Rediscovering Shi’ism was a way of connecting with Iranian culture, and led to a 
profusion of religious associations on campuses and in the homes of intellectuals.  
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Another venue was a sort of club known as Hosseiniyeh Ershad, in which took place “the 
diffusion of a reformulated and modernized understanding of Shi’ite Islam” (Denoeux, p. 
161).    
Nobody contributed more to this modernized understanding of Islam than 
Ali Shari’ati.  His ideas and writings were immensely popular in these settings because 
they appeared to be both Islamic and modern.  The appeal of a modern form of Islam was 
significant because the intelligentsia tended to view the clerics as backward 
traditionalists.  Denoeux (p. 161) quotes Mortimer as attributing to Shari’ati the popular 
idea that “in fighting for Islam one was not demanding a return to obscurantism but 
working towards genuine national liberation and enlightenment.”  The writings of 
revolutionary Islamic thinkers such as Qutb and Mawdudi were also consumed by Iran’s 
educated classes, but Khomeini used Shari’ati’s writings to persuade many intellectuals 
that a revolution under his (Khomeini’s) leadership would be progressive (Arjomand, p. 
94).  The Islamic revival in Iran as a whole became politicized in large part by the revival 
of Islam among Iran’s intellectuals.  “Politicized intelligentsia in addition demanded 
political enfranchisement and inclusion in the political system” (Arjomand, pp. 96-97). 
Although the associations among the intelligentsia did not include the 
cross-cutting ties that bound together members of all social and income strata as in the 
bazaar and urban poor networks, the intelligentsia network became tremendously 
influential once it came together with the Shi’ite hierocracy.  This merge began in the 
1960s and was enabled by the interchange between intellectuals and progressive clerics 
who used their exposure to western ideas to make Shi’ism relevant to modern Iranians 
and their modern problems.  Some religious nationalist liberals (especially Mehdi 
Bazargan) worked towards the same goals from the intelligentsia side, and the meeting of 
the intelligentsia and progressive clerics came first in the form of informal “Islamic 
associations” known as Anjomanha’ye Islami.  Members of the intelligentsia “also 
established contacts with Khomeini in Najaf, while Khomeini and pro-Khomeini forces 
in Iran endeavored to build ties to Iranian students abroad, especially the Moslem Student 
Association in the United States” (Milani, as quoted by Denoeux, pp. 161-62).  The 
religious establishment’s informal connections to the educated classes thus provided the 
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political impetus for the revolution, connections with the urban poor provided the foot 
soldiers, and connections to the bazaar, to which we now turn, provided the financial 
grease for the revolutionary skids. 
 
3. The Mosque – Bazaar Alliance   
The associations which united the religious establishment and the bazaar at the 
time of the revolution were detailed earlier.  Clerics and bazaaris, though, had been 
natural allies for much of Iran’s history.  Merchants in Iran were not, as elsewhere, taken 
over and reorganized by foreigners or seriously infringed upon by religious minorities 
(such as Jews and Bahais).  “Thus, even though the Iranian merchant community 
remained quite fragmented along ethnic and regional lines, it still formed a relatively 
homogeneous group...[which was] one of the factors that spurred Iran’s merchant 
community to defend its collective interests in face of European economic encroachment, 
which was seen as a threat to both Islam and Iranian sovereignty” (Denoeux, p. 64).  The 
ulama’s situation was simultaneously and equally improved, so that when the west began 
to encroach on Iran’s material and cultural interests, the ulama and bazaaris, along with 
the networks they controlled, fell into a natural alliance against the authorities.  “Nobody 
was better qualified than the ulama to speak against the intrusion of [non-believing 
foreigners] in the abode of Islam….As for the bazaaris, they could provide both the 
economic clout and the large numbers of demonstrators that protest movements needed to 
be effective” (Denoeux, p. 66).   
The mosque-bazaar alliance was reinforced by a shared sense of cultural 
alienation from the ruling elite as far back as the 1920s as western ideas began to threaten 
the cultural identities of both the clerics and the bazaaris.  After World War II the bazaar-
mosque connections continued with the same shared outlook since the bazaar and the 
mosque each had to suffer from numerous state attempts to limit their respective spheres 
of influence (Denoeux, p. 136).  Ties were further enhanced through intermarriage, and, 
significantly, by bazaaris receiving “their education in religious schools.  This helps 
explain why throughout their lives they would show great respect for religious learning, 
while their regular involvement in religious meetings and celebrations heightened their 
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self-perceptions in religious terms” (De Groot, as referenced by Denoeux, p. 136).  The 
bazaar was also the financial backbone of the mosque, providing 80 percent of the 
ulama’s financial resources in the 1970s through various collections and endowments 
(Denoeux, p. 137). 
The integration of the Shi’ite hierocracy into all strata of Iranian society through 
autonomous informal networks made it possible for an underestimated, but brilliant 
political operator like Khomeini to translate widely held grievances and perceived threats 
into an Islamic revolution, the likes of which the modern world had never seen and did 
not anticipate.  Does the following description of Khomeini’s network reveal strengths 
and strategies that a similarly charismatic figure could duplicate in Saudi Arabia?  What 
was different about Khomeini compared to other ayatollahs that he was able to 
accomplish this feat from exile?  
 
4. Khomeini’s Network 
The major difference between Khomeini’s network compared to other religious 
networks is that the latter were destabilizing only under certain conditions while the 
former was what Denoeux describes as a radical-utopian network.  Radical-utopian 
networks derive their appeal from “their ability to provide individuals poorly integrated 
into modern society with alternative channels for membership into a tightly knit 
community.  To their members, these networks also constitute instruments toward the 
realization of a millenarian dream, and for the making of a pure religiopolitical order, in 
which injustice and foreign domination will have no place” (Denoeux, p. 172).14   In 
order to create such an appeal Khomeini borrowed heavily from Shari’ati to craft a 
radical-utopian ideology which tapped into the grievances of all those affected by the 
shah’s well-intentioned but insensitive, intrusive policies.  Khomeini’s network 
transmitted the ideology throughout Iranian society, and over time it gained traction at 
each level: 
In making himself the unofficial representative of the disinherited…the 
ayatollah of Najaf succeeded in doing something that no one in Sunni 
                                                 
14 See also the introduction to Iran’s religious networks on p.  30 of this chapter 
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Islam ever had accomplished before.  He attracted the support of the 
traditional rural and urban base that had always followed the lead of a 
cleric of acknowledged stature, as well as the backing of the more modern 
social elements of the cities—students, the salaried middle class, and other 
progressive-minded workers.  These people were receptive to a line of 
thinking that empowered them as harbingers of the future (Kepel, p. 41).   
Hay’ats became critical elements of Khomeini’s network when his followers in 
Tehran’s mosques distributed cassette recordings of Khomeini’s sermons denouncing the 
shah and were and played enthusiastically at hay’at meetings (Arjomand, pp. 92-93; 
Denoeux, p. 159).  Khomeini maintained the financial autonomy necessary to fund the 
widening movement and support his followers because members of his network 
continued to collect religious dues.  Khomeini also maintained an important link to the 
new Iranian middle class by cultivating his existing contacts among religiously 
committed intellectuals who opposed the shah.  Thus, Khomeini’s network was primed 
by the mid-1970s to fulfill three key functions as the revolution gathered momentum: (1) 
Encouraging and widening the movement; (2) Giving shape to the highly decentralized 
movement by providing a charismatic leader around whom the opposition coalesced; and 
(3) Forcing the hand of the most senior clerics, who resisted becoming involved against 
the regime.  Once they had been persuaded that compromise and moderation were self-
defeating strategies, the resources at their disposal became available to Khomeini’s 
network (Denoeux, pp. 183-85).  
The preceding pages describe the opposition to the Iranian regime in terms of its 
informal network structure.  The key points so far observed are that Iran’s dictatorial 
regime forced opposition into informal avenues, but only because the opposition was able 
to function autonomously and connect with many levels of urban society could it 
capitalize on the revolutionary potential of an aggrieved population.  We turn now to the 
structure of Saudi Arabia’s opposition.   
 
B. THE SAUDI OPPOSITION 
The internal workings of the Saudi regime and opposition groups are just as 
difficult to discern and easy to misread now as were the social and political dynamics of 
the Iranian Revolution at the time.  Anthony Cordesman (2002, p. 37), a highly respected 
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scholar in military and Middle Eastern affairs, notes that the Saudi government has a 
policy of avoiding any public disclosure of its internal problems: “The Saudis have 
always treated internal unrest as a virtual state secret.”15  Research by foreigners into 
Saudi society must have the formal approval and supervision of the Saudi government, 
leading another authoritative commentator on Arabian Gulf affairs to lament unofficially 
about the dearth of detailed information available on Saudi informal networks, “We just 
don't have that kind of anthropological, on-the-ground political stuff on Saudi.  Wish we 
did.”  Much can nevertheless be observed about the structure of organizations and forces 
known to be opposed to the Saudi status quo.   
Saudi Arabia’s most vociferous opposition group, al Qaeda on the Arabian 
Peninsula (QAP), operates on the fringes of Saudi society.  And while Usama bin Laden 
(UBL) is charismatic, he has been unsuccessful in rallying most Muslims in general, and 
most Saudi Muslims in particular, to his brand of jihad.  Opponents of Saudi Arabia’s 
status quo with the deepest roots in society profess loyalty to the Al Saud and do not, 
therefore, constitute a threat to the royal family’s longevity.  In other words, in order for 
the opposition to present a considerable threat the stars must be aligned: various 
opposition must forces grow less fractious, united (perhaps) by a prolonged slump in oil 
prices that strips the regime of its patronage power, and a well-integrated and charismatic 
opposition figure must arise around whom the Saudi opposition coalesces.   
A few preliminary comments should be made about the nature of Saudi political 
opposition.  To begin with, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is ruled by a paternalistic, if not 
authoritarian, regime which strictly limits vehicles of political expression.  The royal 
family collects all state revenue and distributes it in a vast system of patronage which 
envelopes every significant economic, educational, social, religious, and political 
institution.  There exists, consequently, a general unwillingness among the myriad 
recipients of state largesse to bite (through political opposition) the hand that feeds them. 
More will follow in Chapter III about the structure of the Saudi regime and its integration 
with society, but for now, recalling Denoeux’s earlier comments on the subject, suffice it 
                                                 
15 Cordesman’s comments were made in the context of the joint Saudi-US investigation of the Khobar 
Towers bombing in 1996 in which 19 US servicemembers were killed. 
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to say that the regime’s control over domestic politics suggests the importance of 
informal political expression.  Secondly, Saudi Arabia’s urban areas have also been 
expanding rapidly for some years now.  “The capital Riyadh is well on its way to 
becoming the first mega city of the region with its current population exceeding 4.26 
million16….The population of Riyadh is projected to exceed 11.1 million by 2020” (Arab 
News, 2005).  This urban population growth cannot be attributed solely to natural 
reproduction.  A recent study17  “revealed that the growth of Riyadh’s population is 
triggered not only by natural reasons but also by a continuing wave of migration of 
Saudis from other parts of the Kingdom. The study observed that Riyadh’s population has 
increased by 120 percent during the last few years. Government and private sector efforts 
are under way to develop Riyadh’s infrastructure to cope with the growing demand” 
(Arab News, 2005).  Rapid urbanization is a factor which has already been shown to be a 
tremendous factor in the proliferation of informal networks.   
Finally, the Saudi opposition, such as it is, rises from a population that is more 
conservative than the Saudi regime.  The implication is that any governmental reform 
agenda must, in order to gain any popular traction, be shown to be in accordance with 
Islamic principles.  This dynamic sets up a real constraint on the regime, which is under 
pressure from external sources, including the United States, to impose educational, 
commercial, and social reforms on Saudi society, but which reforms often run counter to 
Islamic principles and/or traditions.  For example, Saudi Arabia’s World Trade 
Organization (WTO) accession was held up by the U.S. Congress for some time because 
Saudi Arabia upholds the Arab League boycott of trade with Israel18 (Arabic News, 
2005).  Officially abandoning the boycott, as demanded by Congress, would demonstrate 
to the Saudi population that the regime considers commercial interests to take precedence 
over a long-held principle.  While the Saudi religious establishment might be enjoined to 
issue a supportive statement, ordinary Saudis would likely perceive yet another example 
                                                 
16 Including adjoining suburban areas of Al-Dirayya, Al-Haer and Arqa districts 
17 Study conducted by Arriyadh Development Authority 
18 Congressional critics of Saudi Arabia also referenced the kingdom’s human rights record, religious 
intolerance, and alleged terrorism financing. 
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of royal corruption or hypocrisy.  Similar illustrations could be drawn from the arena of 
Saudi education reform and also the role of women in Saudi society. 
The preceding example suggests the prominence of religion in any discussion of 
Saudi opposition, which in turn necessitates a discussion of the terms “Islamism” and 
“Islamist.”  Islamists are those who use the history, symbols, and language of Islam for 
political purposes.  Islamism is political Islam and not Muslim religious practice.  Just as 
the American political spectrum includes various parties, and numerous factions within 
those parties, Islamism encompasses a broad array of agendas.  Islamism therefore 
encompasses Salafis: radical ideologues who construct ideologies which justify violence 
in order to accomplish political ends.  The Salafi spectrum includes Jihadis—individuals 
and organizations who carry out violent acts in the name of Islam.  A further subset 
consists of Transnational Jihadis, the only example of which is al Qaeda.  The term 
“Islamic fundamentalist” is another term used loosely (and often uselessly) to describe 
politically active Muslims on a broad scale from Islamists to Transnational Jihadis.  A 
graphical depiction is shown in Figure 1 below.19   
                                                 
19 The nearer the center of the concentric circles of “Islamism” one goes, the more Sunni/Shi’i 
animosity declines.  This tendency supports the notion that Jihadis are intensely political, willing to put 
aside sectarian differences in the interest of their chief aim. 
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Figure 1 Islam and Islamists in Saudi Arabia20 
 
Saudi opposition organizations, because they arise from a conservative Islamic 
population, are therefore Islamist.  Certainly not all are Jihadis or even Salafis, but all are 
Islamist.  The categorization is helpful in differentiating the various strains of opposition 
(and support) within the Saudi religious milieu.  The discussion below begins by 
discriminating between, and describing, opposition organizations and opposition forces, 
followed by some observations about the likely character and impact of informal urban 
networks in Saudi Arabia. 
As mentioned previously, the Saudi regime permits no formal domestic 
organizations in explicit opposition to the government: neither political party, nor labor 
union; neither professional organization nor student group.  We have seen already that a 
similar scenario in Iran funneled the opposition to the mosque and to informal networks.  
In Saudi Arabia, however, the official religious establishment is an instrument of the state 
and therefore offers little outlet for either popular political expression or clerical 
autonomy.  The establishment, funded by the state, controls personnel management in 
                                                 
20 Glenn E. Robinson, unpublished 
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Saudi mosques and also the content of the sermons preached by those appointees.  The 
Wahhabi clerics and institutions are neither fiscally nor administratively autonomous 
from the Saudi government, as was the Iranian clergy.  I include the religious 
establishment as part of the greater discussion about the Saudi opposition, though, 
because it is the establishment that has historically carried the greatest weight of Saudi 
legitimacy, thereby placing the greatest constraints on the Saudi regime’s room for 
political maneuver.  Nevertheless, “[t]he religious sector is so vast that it is not hard to 
find a niche in it from which to say and write critical things about the Al Saud” (Gause, 
2002).  Gause continues:  
The religious institutions [are] the largest and most powerful organized 
force in Saudi society.  Their funding comes directly from the 
government.  Everyone in the religious sector, from the Grand Mufti 
through the members of the Higher Council of ‘Ulama and the officials in 
the religious ministries to the teachers in the religious colleges and the 
prayer leaders of the local mosques, are all employees of the Saudi state.  
Those who hold the top positions are all appointed directly by the king.  
The partnership began with a political-military-religious alliance between the 
founder of the Saudi state and the founder of the Wahhabi version of Islam, and continues 
today in a mutually beneficial arrangement whereby the Al Saud act as a patron to the 
religious establishment in return for reliable religious justification of the Saudi political 
status quo.  The Wahhabi establishment has lost some of its original credibility (and 
thereby its ability to confer legitimacy on the regime) because, “[a]fter decades of relative 
autonomy, the religious establishment was relegated to secondary status; today, more 
often than not, it rubber stamps official decisions, issuing religious rulings to validate the 
regime’s political stands” (ICG, 2004b).  The ageing clerics of the official establishment 
are losing their appeal to the burgeoning Saudi youth—few young men aspire to join the 
official ulama21.  Members of the establishment have little incentive to speak out against 
the regime that pays them, nor does the establishment take a position on foreign policy 
issues like the Saudi-U.S. relationship.  As noted, however, the establishment is a major 
social force.  And, while there is little reliable documentation to reference, it is entirely 
                                                 
21 The phenomenon is similar to the changing prestige of the Roman Catholic priesthood in 
America—fewer and fewer are hearing or heeding the call to serve in a clerical capacity (Harding, 2005) 
 43
realistic to expect that within such a large and amorphous organization informal factions 
exist which, should the regime go too far too fast down the reformist road, could be 
emboldened to not only write critical things about the Al Saud but also to throw their 
weight behind an emergent and charismatic opponent of the regime.  For this reason, 
attention should be paid if dissenting clerics become willing to suffer the consequences of 
speaking out against the regime (LaPointe, 2005). 
One might reasonably question whether clerics on the government payroll 
constitute a greater threat to the regime than al-Qaeda.  Indeed, despite having no official 
voice within the Saudi religious establishment, al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) 
has become the best-known Saudi opposition organization22.  QAP represents the far 
right of the Islamist scale as a sort of local branch of a Transnational Jihadi group.  Its 
goals, however, are local, not transnational.  QAP is committed to the expulsion of 
infidels (including, and especially, Americans) from the Arabian Peninsula and violent 
overthrow of the regime, against which it has proclaimed takfir, or apostasy (ICG, 2004b; 
Gause, 2004a).   
QAP fits Denoeux’s description of a radical utopian network.  These “always 
have a destabilizing impact on the sociopolitical system, since they essentially represent 
conspiracies organized by small groups of committed activists” (p. 172).  Gilles Kepel (p. 
16) comments on al Qaeda’s general appeal, notes the impact of clandestinity on a 
group’s connection with society: 
Al Qaeda is cut off from the world by its strictly clandestine nature….bin 
Laden’s organization relies on uncertain channels within the mass media, 
which…at best are capable of provoking only an immediate emotional 
reaction of solidarity, a fleeting enthusiasm.  This reaction is instant but 
short-lived, because it prompters have none of the social relay points of a 
well-entrenched movement that might be capable of translating such 
emotion into civil disobedience—unlike the…Iranian clergy in 1978. 
While the Saudi government was slow to acknowledge a local root of 
international terrorism even after the well-documented participation and logistical 
support of Saudi citizens in the events of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on Saudi 
                                                 
22 QAP would reject the descriptor “Saudi” since the term implies recognition the Al Saud as 
legitimate rulers of Arabia.  I use the term simply because QAP is composed of citizens of Saudi Arabia. 
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soil in May and November, 2003 galvanized the Saudi leadership into determined 
counterterrorism (CT) efforts.  Subsequent Saudi CT efforts have been quite successful, 
helped by the fact that QAP violence perpetrated against Saudis, not just Americans or 
foreigners, appears to have marginalized the group from both mainstream Saudi society 
and also senior Wahhabi clerics (Cordesman, 2002; ICG, 2004a))23.  While some Saudis 
may agree with QAP’s condemnation of the Saudi regime’s Islamic credentials (Gause, 
2004a), all indications are that the Saudi public reject UBL’s and QAP’s methods.  This 
is evidence which supports Kepel’s suggestion that QAP is destined for failure as long as 
it fails to establish “social relay points” within Saudi society.  The main point about QAP 
is that, although it garners more headlines than any opposition group or force, it is 
inherently weak and does not pose a significant threat to Saudi regime stability because it 
is disconnected from the larger Saudi society (ICG, 2004b, p. i).  QAP’s revolutionary 
Iranian equivalent is the Fedayin Guerrillas or the Mojahedin-e Khalq, not the powerful 
informal networks of the Iranian bazaar and mosque.  
Whereas QAP is the only opposition organization of significance24, there are 
several important opposition forces at play in Saudi Arabia today.  One force is harsh 
demographics— growing population and rapid urbanization concurrent with increasing 
unemployment constitutes a recipe for widespread discontent.  “Urbanization also 
provides sheer concentrated numbers, an essential element of mass-based politics.  As 
with education, urbanization does not produce uniform political results.  But in the last 20 
years the correlation between urbanization and the growth of Islamist opposition 
throughout the Middle East has been very strong” (Gause, 2002).  While high oil prices 
currently permit the Saudi government to mitigate the problems presented by massive 
unemployment in the short term, stability in the long-term demands economic 
diversification and/or social change which removes the stigma of conducting manual and 
menial labor currently performed by millions of foreign workers25.  The Saudi 
                                                 
23 Even the most vocal critics of the regime among Saudi clerics were quick to distance themselves 
from Al Qaeda and UBL after 9/11. 
24 Other dissident organizations exist, such as the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights 
(CDLR), which is based outside Saudi Arabia in London, but have had no demonstrable success in creating 
momentum for social or political change within the kingdom. 
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government has demonstrated both its willingness and ability to deport foreigners en 
masse—witness the wholesale deportation of Yemenis during the first Gulf War 
(Nonneman, 2002).  Both forms of change, however, disrupt the status quo of Saudi 
domestic power.  Economic diversification would reduce the royal monopoly on state 
revenues.  Moreover, establishing a tax base to extract revenue from a diversified 
economy and a “Saudised”26 workforce (in which many Saudis may accept employment 
in fields previously considered to be demeaning) will undoubtedly require the 
government to be more accountable to the masses—effectively distributing power down-
echelon.  It is true that demographic problems do not necessarily constitute direct 
opposition to the Saudi regime, but a massive number of discontented young men do 
constitute a force in favor of a change in the status quo. 
Another force opposed to the status quo is the Islamist movement.  The regime 
has faced challenges from Islamists before, most notably the takeover of the Grand 
Mosque in Mecca in 1979 by a group of religious zealots.  The Islamists, however, are far 
from being a monolithic block of anti-regime opposition groups.  As described earlier, 
there are many shades of political Islam, including social reformers, political reformers, 
religious conservatives, and a few secular liberal reformers.  The Islamist opponents are 
thus a fragmented force, but a force nonetheless.  The assorted component groups are 
described differently by various scholars.  A fairly current and descriptive taxonomy is 
used by the International Crisis Group in their 2004 background report on Saudi 
Islamists, and will be used below.  The categories, summarized in Figure 2, include 
Jihadists, Reformists, Rejectionists, and Shi’ite Islamists.  
 
 
                                                 
25 Some indicators suggest that suggest that such a change is already occurring in Saudi society.  A 
recent Arab News report states: “The tragedy about this job-hunting drama is that university graduates are 
fighting with others to join the military services with the rank of private....The fight for this kind of jobs 
reflects the plight of the armies of unemployed Saudi youth who have become a liability to their families, 
causing mounting tension and anxiety in the family. College graduates now view applying for the job of a 
solider not as catastrophic; for them something is better than nothing” (Hashim, 2005). 
26 “Saudisation” is a term used to describe the effort to place qualified Saudi nationals in jobs 
historically held by foreigners.  The term is gaining acceptance—witness a recruiting site at 
www.Saudisation.com. 
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1. Jihadists27   
Jihadists stand against the Saudi regime and against U.S. influence in both the 
Kingdom and the larger Muslim world.  As noted, the violent methods of radical salafist 
groups such as al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) lack broad-based popular 
support in Saudi Arabia for revolutionary action to overthrow the Al Saud.  Isolated 
support occasionally surfaces, however.  From within Saudi Arabia, for example, before 
the May, 2003 bombings, three clerics published their condemnation of liberal reformers, 
implied approval for violence against non-Muslims, and endorsed a group of nineteen 
radicals identified by the regime.  These pronouncements were followed later in the year 
by recantations by the same three clerics and a call for Saudis to obey the official Saudi 
ulama (body of Muslim clerics).  Whether sincere or coerced, the recantations 
demonstrate a continued ability of the regime to procure what it desires from the official 
religious establishment.   
The regime has less control over Saudi jihadists who operate abroad.  The best-
known of these is Sa’ad al-Faqih, a London-based veteran of the Afghani Mujahideen 
campaign against the Soviets.  He is an outspoken and virulent critic of the Saudi regime, 
but his ability to instigate protest within the Kingdom is demonstrably limited28.  The 
largest rally he has so far been able to produce consisted of less than three hundred 
participants, and a follow on effort was completely unsuccessful (Gause, 2004b).  While 
his English-language pronouncements are cloaked in the language of human-rights and 
democracy, his message to Saudis in Arabic have supported “a strict interpretation of the 
Shari’a and Islamic custom, opposed most rights for women, made strong anti-Shi’ite 
statements, opposed the Arab-Israeli peace process and denied Israel’s right to exist” 
(Cordesman, 2002).   
Jihadist opposition is by all measures limited.  QAP retains the ability to create 
sporadic demonstrations of defiance, but these are episodic and are a nuisance, rather  
 
                                                 
27 Categorized by Gause (2004) as “Islamist Opposition”, and by Cordesman (2002) as, simply, 
“religious…groups that use violence to achieve their ends” 
28 Al-Faqih runs an organization called Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA), which 
advances Islamist opposition to the Saudi regime via the internet and satellite television (Gause, 2004). 
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than a threat, to the regime.  Little public support has been shown for vocal opponents of 
the regime, and the regime anyway retains a proven capability to persuade its critics to 
change their tune or stop singing. 
 
2. Reformists 
This collection of actors is subdivided into political reformists and social 
reformists.  The best known of the political reformists29 are independent of the religious 
establishment, and have their roots in the sahwa30 movement (ICG, 2004b).  They first 
came to the regime’s attention during the Gulf War of 1990-91, during which many of 
them were jailed for their criticism of the government’s close and dependent relationship 
with the United States.  Even at the height of their popularity, however, Islamist political 
reformists have not called into question the Al Saud’s legitimacy as rulers of Saudi 
Arabia.  Cordesman (2002) says of Sheikh Safar al-Hawali, a prominent (former sahwa) 
political reformist, “[t]heir main grievances have not been based on direct criticism of the 
Saudi government and the royal family, but rather on external issues such as Western 
domination and neocolonialism.  Hawali did not question the political or religious 
authority of the Saudi state, but criticized its subordination to…the United States.” After 
9/11, however, these same critics came out forcefully against both UBL and foreign 
critics of the Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism.  Because of their early anti-regime stance 
(which was in stark contrast to the rubber-stamp loyalty of the religious establishment) 
leaders among this group have earned a fair amount of credibility among ordinary Saudis.  
The Al Saud’s recent success in co-opting prominent members of the sahwa group is 
therefore a significant boon to the regime’s legitimacy.  The other side of the sahwa coin, 
however, is that when political reformists like the sahwa group speak of reform to Saudi 
society, they mean reforming those parts of society that have been influenced by the west 
and/or secular ideas and have drifted away from (the sahwa interpretation of) pure 
Islamic law and custom.  Islamist political reformers are thus staunchly opposed to 
                                                 
29 Referred to by Gause (2004) as “Salafi Islamic activists,” while Cordesman (2002) identifies “Hard-
line peaceful oppositionists,” non-violent Islamist oppositionists.”  
30 Sahwa translates to “awakening”. 
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domestic reform of the educational, administrative, and judicial systems, and also oppose 
the Saudi-U.S. relationship (Gause, 2004a). 
Political reformists are not a unified block, however.  As the ICG reports in its 
2004 report, Who are the Islamists?, there were, since before the Gulf War of 1990-91, “a 
variety of undercurrents, some closer to Wahhabism, others to the Muslim Brotherhood.  
Among the latter are sub-divisions between so-called Bannaists and Qutbists31.  Today, 
such divisions are manifested in conflicting positions on issues such as relations with 
liberal reformers, Shi’ites or Sufis, and attitudes toward al-Qaeda and other violent 
Islamists.” 
Social Reformists are an emerging, informal group that seems comfortable with 
democratic ideals of popular participation and political action based on compromise and 
tolerance.  This group is still stoutly religious, but willing to associate and participate 
with secular reformers, women, and even Shi’ites.  Islamist reformers are the only group 
interested in a fundamental change in the political status quo, but go out of their way to 
emphasize their loyalty to the Saudi state and regime while simultaneously calling for a 
constitutional monarchy and greater political freedom.  It is a tough sell, especially since 
the social reformist’s goals are more aligned than any other Saudi opposition element 
with American desires for reform.  In order to achieve these reforms, however, the Saudi 
regime would undermine its support from both the religious establishment and the salafi 
activists.   
The paradoxical choice with which the Saudi regime must grapple (and which 
U.S. foreign policy decision makers must acknowledge) is that effecting reforms will 
cause short-term instability by alienating the regime’s Islamic legitimacy.  “Islamist 
activists, while rallying to support the regime, also warned against political changes that 
would call into question the privileged place that the religious establishment and the 
“Wahhabi” interpretation of Islam have in the country” (Gause, 2004b).  This paradox is 
not widely appreciated in the United States, as illustrated by a recent statement from the 
                                                 
31 Bannaism and Qutbism are –isms attached to the ideas of the founder of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, and its other renowned ideologue, Sayyid Qutb. 
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Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C.: “The Saudis can no longer be with us 
and against us.  They must be made to choose” (CSP, 2005). 
 
Saudi Islamists
       Regime  Political Reform   Social Reform   Saudi - U.S.
(Salafi) Jihadists  Considers it Utopian: desire Violently oppose U.S. = "far
QAP (marginalized by apostate, violently Islamic state free change to status enemy," KSA =
society) opposed from 'infidel' quo "near enemy"
Salafi Islamic Formerly opposed, Silent Strongly oppose Oppose
Activists / Sahwa now profess changes to 
Emerging alliance with loyalty, oppose education, role of
Islamist Political Re- QAP violence (esp. women
Formers since 2003 attacks)
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(Social) vehemently oppose political reform conservatism: ad- espouse ideas 
(limited impact within violence status qo because society: open favorable to U.S.
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and royal allies) social reform interpretation of advocates
Islam
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courted by some National Dia- freedom
reformers and King logues, favor
Abdullah democracy
Religious Rubber-stamp Politically neutral Oppose change Politically
Establishment approval, condemn to status quo neutral








Rejectionist Islamists do not constitute a unified group, either socially or 
politically, but share some general characteristics: rejection of a Saudi nation-state; 
rejection of the sahwa point of view as overly political; and rejection of the Jihadists as 
un-Islamic deviants.  Whereas sahwa reformists engaged in political discourse and 
broad social and cultural issues, rejectionists “focused on questions of individual faith, 
morals and ritual practices” (ICG, 2004b).  Rejectionists tend, according to the same 
International Crisis Group report, to be “hostile to the very concept of the nation-state, 
seeking not to modify it but to break with it—most often through withdrawal but at 
times through revolt.”  It was from a rejectionist strain that Juhayman al-Utaybi’s 
followers seized Mecca’s Grand Mosque in 1979.  Other rejectionists withdrew from 
society, living either in self-imposed exile in neighboring countries or among desert-
dwelling Bedouin.  A third group of rejectionists dismissed both Wahhabism and the 
sahwa teachings centered in the education establishment, contenting themselves with 
learning through informal religious study circles (ICG, 2004b).  The most visible 
rejectionist organization in Saudi Arabia, until its repression in the aftermath of the 
Grand Mosque takeover, has been al-Jamaa al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (JSM).  JSM 
ideas concerning social corruption and moral decadence persisted among rejectionists 
even after the organization dissolved.  These ideas were challenged after the Gulf War 
of 1991, which effectively politicized rejectionists by compelling them to either support 
or condemn the regime’s sharp repression of increasingly critical sahwa activists.  
Those rejectionists who were persuaded that the regime (including both the 
establishment clerics who unconditionally supported the regime as well as sahwa 
activists who recanted or moderated their stance)  
had become impious joined the jihadists.  Other rejectionists retreated again from both 
politics and society, while others have joined one of the various reformist circles (ICG, 
2004b). 
 
4. Shi’ite Islamists 
Saudi Shi’ites compose approximately ten percent of the Saudi population, 
residing mainly in the oil-rich Eastern Province.  The official Wahhabi stance towards 
 51
Shi’ism is that it is a heretical interpretation of Islam.  Shi’ites have for decades, 
therefore, been treated as second-class Saudi citizens.  Following the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution in 1979, Saudi Shi’ite activists were emboldened to confront the regime, but 
were subsequently crushed by the Saudi National Guard.  Two decades later Saudi 
Shi’ites are still a persecuted minority and maintain a low profile, although Crown Prince 
Abdullah has deliberately included Shi’ite leaders in his ongoing National Dialogues32.  
Saudi Shi’ite extremist groups “like the Saudi Hezbollah probably have less than 1,000 
members of any kind and less than 250 hard core members.  Most Saudi Shi’ites still are 
not militant and even most Shi’ites in exile advocate peaceful change…The Shi’ite 
population of Saudi Arabia is also too small to succeed in any kind of uprising or 
separatism” (Cordesman, 2002). 
 
C. SAUDI POLITICAL APATHY? 
Despite these various opposition forces there is a notable absence of visible, 
vigorous political activity among ordinary Saudis.  This can be attributed to one, or a 
combination of, three plausible possibilities: (1) The regime has successfully muted 
credible opposition; (2) Saudis are politically apathetic; or (3) The regime has forced the 
opposition into informal venues. 
Hypotheses one, a successful counter-opposition effort by the regime, is 
eminently plausible based on observing the regime’s effective domination of the religious 
establishment, but even more so in its repeated ability to persuade many of its critics to 
come to its side during crises such as the Gulf War and 9/11.  Repression has had an 
indirect effect as well.  Routine imprisonment of outspoken critics among journalists, 
reformers, and clerics has served to chill the fervor of most potential activists.  As of this 
writing the three signatories of the December, 2003 petition calling for a Constitutional 
Monarchy, who have refused to retract their appeal, remain imprisoned.  This chilling 
                                                 
32 The National Dialogues were initiated by (then) Crown Prince Abdullah and brought together in 
2003 and 2004  “Saudis from diverse religious backgrounds and political orientations…to discuss with 
unusual frankness sensitive issues linked to religious differences, education and causes of Islamic extremis” 
(ICG, 2004a).  “The meeting called for respect for differences of opinion within Islam and for 
strengthening national unity, while cautioning that the central role of the religious establishment in national 
life should not be questioned” (Gause, 2004b). 
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effect may explain the quiescence of Islamist reformers during Saudi Arabia’s recent 
municipal elections.33 
Except in the Eastern province where the Shia are concentrated, participation in 
the elections was quite low.  This suggests that there is not a pent-up demand for political 
participation (Gause, 2005).  But the second possible explanation for the lack of visible, 
vigorous political activity—that Saudis are politically apathetic—must be approached 
with care because the measurements used to gauge political activity in western 
democracies, which are characterized by a dynamic interaction between taxpaying 
citizens and an accountable government, cannot be directly applied to the highly 
functional Saudi political culture of leadership by consensus but which has no history or 
institutions of democratic participation.34  The fact that Saudis do not participate in 
politics in a way that is easily measurable by western instruments could mean that Saudis 
are content to participate in politics through their tradition of leadership-by-consensus, 
not necessarily that they are politically apathetic.  Another ramification of Saudis’ lack of 
experience in democracy was that even a minimal amount of organization in the many, 
many candidates’ election campaigns was sufficient to produce victory.  It was, 
moreover, conservative Islamists who most successfully organized the street, violating 
the rules in the process by advocating a ticket of candidates.  The regime took no 
corrective or punitive action against the Islamists, however, suggesting that the royal 
family did not want to risk a confrontation.  Political and social reformists, in the shadow 
of their still-imprisoned colleagues, did not demonstrate a significant amount of political 
organization (Gause, 2005).  It is also worth noting the election took place at a time when 
oil prices approaching $60 per barrel enabled the government to manage popular 
discontent by opening the patronage relief valve.  Previously, the loudest voices for real 
change in Saudi Arabia arose at a point in time when low oil prices were squeezing the 
regime’s source of patronage.   
                                                 
33 These elections were one of the first, tentative steps towards a more representative form of Saudi 
government.  The elections featured a plethora of candidates to fill half of the seats on municipal councils, 
which function in an advisory capacity only.   
34 Political apathy, a lack of popular interest in politics or a quietist attitude towards government, 
should not be confused with “voter apathy”, with which any American politician is familiar. 
 53
The most interesting possible explanation for visible, vigorous political activity, 
whether or not the first two could be proven, is that currents of Saudi opposition flow 
through informal channels, outside the pervasive influence of state institutions.  The 
existence of informal networks (in a society in which avenues for formal opposition are 
in the firm control of the regime) is a safe assumption.  The nature of those networks, as 
mentioned, is not apparent even to close observers of Saudi Arabia.  Some likely sources 
of networks which could, in Denoeux’s terminology, be double-edged, are informal study 
groups, student groups, and the diwaniyeh.  The rejectionist tradition of holding religious 
study groups in member’s homes offers a precedent similar to the Iranian hay’at.  The 
growth of secondary and university education opportunities also favors the emergence of 
networks of student groups.  The Saudi tradition of diwaniyeh is a third possible 
facilitation of informal networks.   The Saudi king has traditionally held a majlis, or 
court, in the primary executive office called the Royal Diwan.    
The purpose of the majlis was to provide Saudi citizens an opportunity to 
make personal appeals to the king for redress of grievances or assistance 
in private matters. Plaintiffs typically sought the king's intervention with 
the state's bureaucracy. During the reigns of King Khalid and King Fahd, 
it was customary for each person attending the majlis to explain his 
complaints and simultaneously present a written petition, which the 
monarch would later study and answer in a subsequent session.  Provincial 
governors follow the king’s example and hold a public majlis, “often on a 
daily basis, at which [they hear] petitions from local residents” (U.S. 
Library of Congress, 2005).   
These traditional meetings could conceivably facilitate collective opposition 
activity, but the risk is minimal because provincial governors are all either members of, 
or owe their position to, the royal family. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
The differences between the groups opposed to the Iranian regime and the Saudi 
regime are evident.  Iran’s opposition was rooted deep in society.  Iranian opposition 
forces found a voice and a weapon in the informal networks of the mosque and the 
bazaar, which were, in turn, animated by a charismatic leader in Khomeini.  Saudi 
Arabia’s loudest opposition group, on the other hand, has limited roots in Saudi society.  
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And while UBL is charismatic, he has been unsuccessful in rallying most Muslims in 
general, and most Saudi Muslims in particular, to his brand of jihad.  Opponents of Saudi 
Arabia’s status quo with the deepest roots in society have also stated and demonstrated 
loyalty to the Al Saud regime, so they cannot be considered a credible threat to the royal 
family’s longevity.  If Saudi opposition forces grow less fractious, are united by a 
prolonged slump in oil prices that strips the regime of its patronage power, or if a well-
integrated and charismatic opposition figure arises around whom the Saudi opposition 
coalesces, then the al-Saud will face a true threat.  Their ability to weather such a storm, 




III. THE REGIME 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Jack Miklos, an American foreign service officer who served in Iran asks, “Once 
having chosen the authoritarian path, is it possible to ease back after a time and turn from 
master and leader to servant answerable to independent opinion and contrary views 
(1983, pp. 16-17)?”  He answers his own question by quoting Samuel Huntington, who, 
says Miklos, could recall no incidence of a direct and peaceful shift from absolute 
monarchy to an electoral regime, “with a government responsible to parliament and a 
king who reigned but did not rule.  Such a change, he points out, would involve a basic 
shift in legitimacy of the monarch to the sovereignty of the people and such change 
generally requires either time or revolution.  Wherever time is not available, the result is 
revolution” (Miklos, pp. 16-17). 
The Iranian case fits the description offered by Miklos and Huntington, but 
significant differences between the two regimes’ structures persuade me that Saudi 
Arabia is not on the brink of destruction, nor collapsing from within, “just like Iran.”  
Certainly some similarities between pre-revolutionary Iran and contemporary Saudi 
Arabia emerge from the preceding analysis—both are rentier states; both aim first at 
regime survival; and both command substantial armed forces—but the differences 
suggest to me that the Al Saud have time.  These differences can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. There is no autonomous, cohesive opposition group threatening the Saudi regime.  
Saudi reformers take pains to state their case for reform within the current system.  
Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) has been marginalized, and the reform 
movement is fractious. 
2. Saudi society is evolving incrementally, unlike Iranian society whose ability to 
withstand the disruptions of change was outpaced by the modernizing surge 
imposed by the Shah. 
3. The Saudi regime is well integrated with society and exercises patronage over its 
power centers, whereas the shah disregarded, disparaged, or failed to recognize 
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Iranian centers of power and so either could not, or would not, integrate with 
society, relying instead on a small group of men whose loyalty was assured to 
administer the modern institutions of the state. 
4. The Shah was a true autocrat and disregarded popular opinion and sentiment, 
whereas the Al Saud are more paternalistic and pay careful attention to it so as to 
avoid unnecessary conflict.  The Saudi tradition of consensus-based leadership 
also contrasts starkly with the shah’s willful appointment of those who would tell 
him what he wanted to hear. 
5. Both dynasties were established by conquest, but the Al Saud have tribal roots, 
and strong patron-client and intermarriage ties, whereas the shah cultivated no ties 
to powerful Iranian social groups.   
6. The shah based his legitimacy on his Persian forebears and coercive power, while 
the Al Saud base theirs on shared religious and tribal ties.  This affords the Al 
Saud breathing room during times of prolonged interruption of rents.  The 
strength of these ties endured a decade of severe testing during the 1990s which 
saw high debt, low oil prices, and contested Islamic credentials after the regime 
invited American armed forces to establish and maintain bases in Saudi Arabia. 
7. The Iranian state depended on the shah’s presence.  Not so the Saudi state, where 
there is every indication that succession, for the current generation, is agreed upon 
and that both Crown Prince Abdullah and his successor will be able to assume the 
throne without significant disruptions (ICG, 2004a; Gause, 2004; Cordesman, 
2002; Kipper, 2005a and 2005b). 
In short, the Saudi royal family is heavily integrated into society, but the shah was 
not.  This failure of the shah’s modern state to integrate with society was a critical factor 
in the success of the opposition.  Jeff Goodwin, in a well-respected study of revolutions, 
supports this assertion: “Revolutions are unlikely, in fact, where the state has institutional 
linkages with nonelite groups, is organized in a rational-bureaucratic fashion, and 
effectively governs throughout the entire territory of the national society” (Goodwin, 
2001, p. 27).  The significance of Goodwin’s comment for the Iranian case is that it was  
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Khomeini, not the shah, who was able—by mobilizing all the resources available to him 
through the mosque, bazaar, and intelligentsia networks—to build a coalition which cut 
across all levels of Iranian society.   
Clearly, then, opposition groups in an authoritarian state can sometimes 
accumulate a significant amount of power.  But this happens rarely enough that, if that 
power becomes sufficient to challenge the state’s monopoly on coercive, institutional, 
and economic power, it is a newsworthy event.  While states are certainly constrained by 
external threats and a limited treasury, the balance of power clearly favors the state over 
the opposition: the state appoints military leaders; state institutions control the budget and 
expenditures; the state dispenses funds which employ large numbers of people, provide 
education, and house the poor; commercial regulations and trade relationships are 
controlled by the government, which also holds the levers of police power.   
One factor in state’s structure is the context in which the regime exists and 
functions.  I will describe the Iranian and Saudi contexts in terms of history, national 
society, and regime ends and means.  This chapter will demonstrate how state structure 
contributed to one regime’s loss of power, how the other maintains its current grip, and 
will assess the durability of that grip.  “The state” can also be classified, at one end of a 
spectrum, as a liberal democracy, which tends to institute checks and balances on the use 
of state power by any individual or office, or, on the other end, as an authoritarian regime 
dominated by an autocrat who is able to use all or some of these advantages to preserve 
its power.  Both the pre-revolutionary Iranian regime and the current Saudi state tend 
towards the latter.  An equally important distinction to make about state structure is the 
extent to which it can be described as extractive or distributive.  This element of state 
structure bears heavily on the degree to which the state is integrated with society, which 
is directly related to the government’s ability to weather troubled times (Robinson, 
2005b).  Special mention is made below of extractive and distributive states before 






B. EXTRACTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE STATE STRUCTURES 
The terms extractive and distributive refer essentially to where governments get 
their revenues from, and what they do with them.  An extractive state, such as the United 
States and other developed, capitalist states, extracts a significant percentage of its 
revenue from its citizens and their commercial interests via taxes, then redistributes those 
funds in some form of state expenditures for services such as education, infrastructure, or 
healthcare.  This interaction is illustrated in Figure 3.  While the state retains a monopoly 
on coercive force, it does not have to rely on physical coercion as a first resort in order to 
collect taxes or conduct other measures which the population finds objectionable.  
Society, in turn, through political activism, holds the state accountable for the 
expenditure of the funds it relinquishes, and the (often acrimonious) debate about the 
amounts and targets of both extraction and expenditure result in pact-making, which 
binds state and society tightly together. 
 
Figure 3 State-Society Relations in Extractive States35 
 
Strong state-society integration engenders political participation and accountability, and 
thereby produces stability.  Such states tend to be democratic and capitalistic. 
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Distributive states, also known as Rentier states, do not extract a significant 
portion of revenue via taxes, depending instead on rents.  The source is most often a 
natural resource such as oil, minerals, or precious metals, but can also be a state’s foreign 
policy, the “sale” of which garners massive amounts of foreign financial aid for the seller 
via state-to-state transfers. 
 
Figure 4 State-Society Relations in Distributive (or Rentier) States36 
 
As shown in Figure 4, the government distributes these rents by providing services to 
society, or to select social groups, in a system of state patronage.  A sufficient and steady 
flow of rents, therefore, produces a quiescent citizenry that is dependent on government 
and therefore unlikely to rock the proverbial boat by opposing government policy.  Low 
societal political participation yields an equivalent low level of government 
accountability and transparency, both of which combine to create weak state-society 
integration.  The unfortunate consequence of such weak integration is that a prolonged 
interruption of rents results inevitably in a prolonged interruption of state patronage, 
which produces political and social instability. 
 
                                                 
36 Glenn E. Robinson, unpublished 
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C. STRUCTURE OF THE IRANIAN STATE 
As mentioned previously, one cannot adequately describe a regime’s structure 
without first establishing the historical and social context in which it existed, along with 
the regime’s ends and means.  These factors overlap and intertwine, but ultimately, in the 
Iranian case, describe an authoritarian, distributive state with weak connections between 
the regime and society. 
 
1. Context 
The context in which the shah operated was shaped by Iran’s historic legacy as 
the great Persian civilization, by a transitional society, a reinvented monarchy, and by 
religion.  Miklos (p. 20) reinforces the latter pair: “Two of the most powerful threads that 
run through Iran’s history are religion and the monarchy.  Sometimes allied, sometimes at 
cross purposes, they have shaped the destiny and character of the Persians from the 
outset.”  The shah drew on the monarchic legacy of Iran’s illustrious Persian history to 
justify his absolute rule and in his attempts to gain popular support for his reforms.  
These were designed to pull Iran from the third world back into global prominence.  To 
achieve this end the shah had to impose modernity on a traditional society, forcing it to 
transition from the old status quo to a new one.  This process was begun by the shah’s 
father, Reza Shah Pahlavi.   
Reza Shah Pahlavi was an autocratic modernizer.  A contemporary of modern 
Turkey’s founder Kemal Ataturk, he seized power after WWI and began reforms 
designed to revive Iran’s position in the modern world.  Kamrava (1990) provides a 
useful summary of this era:  
The Pahlavi era marked the establishment of a highly differentiated and 
structurally strong political system in Iran...[D]uring Reza Shah’s reign 
between 1921 and 1941, most of the basic institutions needed for the 
elementary needs of society were created.  Reza Shah did not so much 
establish these institutions but rather secularized them by transferring their 
control from the [clerics] over to the state, a task in which he often used 
brutal tactics.  Such newly secularized institutions included the 
educational, administrative, health, and judicial systems, most of which 
were often modeled after those in Europe.  Some other institutions, 
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notably the military and the state bureaucracy, were rebuilt almost entirely 
and created anew (p. 14). 
Overcoming the inertia of the traditional status quo demanded an authoritarian 
regime with a firm grip on the states coercive instruments.    Muhammad Reza Shah 
Pahlavi followed in his father’s autocratic footsteps.  Miklos (p. 16), writing on the 
subject of modernization and Iran, states that “...leaders of traditional societies today 
seem to have little choice but to attempt to promote social and economic reform.  To 
achieve this they are generally forced to the conclusion that they must resort to 
authoritarian measures which are effective because they rest on centralized power.”  
While Iran has a long history of monarchical rule, Halliday (1979, pp. 29, 30) points out 
that the Pahlavi dynasty ruled a much different Iran than did their predecessors.  Under 
the Pahlavis Iran became a capitalist nation-state which controlled its entire territory and 
maintained a large standing army, rather than an earlier pre-capitalist state which did not 
extend far beyond urban areas and did not support any significant armed force.   
Pahlavi authoritarianism and modernizing ambition also extended to the economy.  
Many third-world economies were transformed by colonialism, but Iran was never 
subject to a western colonial power—neither the negative aspects of social and cultural 
upheaval, nor the economic transformation required to meet the economic requirements 
of the more developed capitalist countries” (Halliday, 1979, p. 31).  “The shah in the 
1970s nevertheless voiced the expectation that Iran would become one of the world’s five 
top powers in this century: such a fantasy encouraged heavy collaboration with 
multinational corporations and short shrift for the everyday needs of most Iranians” 
(Keddie, 1981, pp. 169-70).  Substantial oil revenues, monopolized and distributed by the 
state alone, fueled the shah’s ambition.  But the oil industry did not encourage the growth 
of a strong, autonomous bourgeoisie class because employees were on the state payroll. 
Bureaucrats in the various administrative offices of the Iranian state formed another non-
autonomous portion of the middle class.  Miklos (1983) observes the growth and modern 
character of these administrators:  
The advent of modernizing reform accelerated the development of the 
middle class, but one different in character from the old bourgeoisie.  Few 
of the earlier middle class had a Western education.  The essential 
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qualification for admittance to the new professional/bureaucratic middle 
class was a Western education or a similar kind of education…Students 
sent abroad for their university education formed, on their return, the core 
of the new professional middle class (p. 25). 
Authoritarianism, therefore, went hand-in-hand with Iran’s transitional society as 
modern institutions and customs were imposed on the majority of society by a relatively 
small middle class of Iranians.   
 What the regime lacked in popular support it made up for through international 
allies, particularly the United States.  Iran’s abundant natural resources and its strategic 
position between Russia and the Gulf ensured that the US foreign policy would 
“allocate…a major role” to Iran (Halliday, 1979, p. 32).  Indeed, US patronage enabled 
the Iranian regime to overcome the three major challenges to its survival since WWII.  
The first of these threats was the allied occupation during WWII when the Allies invaded 
Iran to provide supplies to Russian front.  The state was politically discredited because of 
its failure to resist the foreign armies and the first Pahlavi shah was exiled.  His son, 
Mohammad Reza, then aged twenty-two, assumed the throne, which was further 
undermined when the Anglo-Russian occupiers permitted political freedoms to the 
opposition by restoring trade unions, a free press, and permitting political parties.   
The US propped up the young shah with military and financial aid, and declared 
that Iran would receive US assistance against anti-communist forces (Halliday, 1979, p. 
24).  The second US intervention occurred in 1951, as the Cold War intensified.   
Mohammad Mosaddeq was elected Prime Minister with the backing of the communist-
leaning Tudeh Party.  He promptly nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and was 
unable to convince the US that he was not opening Iran up to communist influence.37  
Mosaddeq was ousted in a 1953 in coup, in which the CIA had an active role.38  With 
                                                 
37 American anti-communism was at a peak during this time, following on the heels of McCarthyism 
and China’s communist revolution. 
38 Gasiorowski (2004) details the CIA’s activities in Operation Ajax, concluding that the CIA was 
certainly instrumental in the success of the coup, “we have no way to determine the extent to which Iranian 
actors...independently contributed to them” (p. 259).  He states that Mosaddeq’s tactical errors, and luck on 
the part of Mosaddeq’s opponents as equally instrumental factors in the coup’s success. According to 
Arjomand, Halliday, and others, the CIA’s role in the coup is exaggerated by both Iranian conspiracy 
theorists and the CIA.  While the CIA certainly had an active role, the fact that Mosaddeq’s support among 
both the general public and Iranian elites was already waning was equally important. 
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Mosaddeq’s demise the shah regained absolute power and “the Pahlavi state emerged 
“stronger than it had been prior to the oil [nationalization] crisis” (Halliday, 1979, p. 26).   
The US role in the regime’s third crisis was to tie its patronage to reforms intended to 
move Iran further away from communism.  The shah thus initiated his White Revolution, 
which included some land reform and made some cosmetic efforts to reduce both 
corruption and military spending but which did not really impede his consolidation of 
power.  As mentioned in Chapter II, some of these reforms impinged on the traditional 
spheres of significant segments of Iranian society.  The consequent popular opposition 
which broke out in 1963 was bloodily suppressed by the army, and the path was thus 
cleared of any obstacles which remained in the way of the shah’s modernization agenda 
(Halliday, 1979, pp. 25-27).  US involvement in Iran, although pursuing its own interests 
in maintaining a patronizing relationship with a non-communist country of such strategic 
significance, nevertheless impacted the Iranian political context by helping, at critical 
junctures, to either preserve or strengthen an otherwise vulnerable Iranian regime. 
Besides modernization and restoration of Persian greatness, the Iranian context 
was influenced by religion.  Arjomand (1988), commenting on the revolution’s cause, 
notes that it was a thoroughly modern event in that centralization of the state and the 
subsequent transformation of society brought the state into conflict with a longstanding 
institution of Iranian society: 
Islamic ideology, which has determined the direction (emphasis mine) of 
the Iranian revolution…could not have succeeded without the unusual 
institutional assets of its proponents, the Shi’ite men of religion.  The story 
of the Islamic revolution in Iran must therefore begin with the 
establishment of Shi’ism as the state religion in 1501 [and includes] the 
consolidation of Shi’ite clerical power and the prevalence of a dual system 
of authority until the onset of centralization and the expansion of the 
power of the state (p. 5). 
Under both Pahlavis the ulama’s traditional sphere of influence was 
incrementally, but methodically, diminished.  Under Reza Shah they lost control over 
education and judicial systems as well as their partnership and access to Iranian political 
elites.  The White Revolution’s land reforms resulted in the ulama’s loss of both endowed 
religious estates and the revenue stream from landholding religious foundations 
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(Arjomand, 1988, pp. 193-94; Miklos, 1983, p. 30).  The regime also established 
religious organizations to propagandize the Iranian populace with the state’s official 
version of Shi’ism.  Eventually, then, the modernizing state’s encroachment on the 
ulama’s interests, along with a broader cultural and moral decay (from the ulama’s 
perspective), produced a religious network in Iran that became destabilizing (Denoeux, p. 
170).  The contextual significance of religion to Iran’s structure is simply that, despite the 
shah’s reforms, and attempts to secularize the religious establishment, Iranian clerics 
maintained the deepest reservoir of Iranian tradition and identity, against which the shah 
had to shape his regime in order to bring Iran into modern prominence. 
Another important segment of society that was negatively affected by the shah’s 
reforms was the bazaar community.  The bazaar was able to adapt to the changing 
economic environment imposed by the shah, although its economic clout declined 
relative to the oil-dominated economy of the 1960s and 1970s.  Modernization meant for 
the bazaar a series of seemingly arbitrary tax laws and commercial restraints, and worst 
of all the shah’s anti-profiteering campaign of 1975-76, which caused untold (and unjust) 
hardship, imprisonment, or molestation for hundreds of bazaaris.  As Denoeux (p. 147) 
puts it, bazaaris united in opposition to the state because:  
[T]he state was interfering with the market in a way that not only damaged 
their opportunities for profit, but made it difficult for them to operate at 
all.  Important as well was the regime’s frequently expressed contempt for 
the bazaaris and their “worm-ridden shops,” as the shah once referred to 
them.  The Iranian ruler missed few opportunities to portray the bazaaris 
as a reactionary group opposed to change and constituting an obstacle to 
the country’s socioeconomic modernization.  These attacks were offensive 
to the bazaaris’ sense of self-worth and fostered their anger at the regime.  
The regime’s two main ends, modernization and regime preservation, have been 
mentioned already in the preceding discussion and are woven into the context in which 
the Iranian regime found itself in the 1970s.  What remains is to see how the regime was 
structured in order to achieve these ends.  After the shah survived the 1960-63 challenge 
to his regime not only was domestic opposition effectively nullified but the shah also 
enjoyed foreign support.  This enabled the shah to increasingly accrue power, and the 
Iranian state became ever more centralized and repressive.  But centralization is no 
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panacea, as Arjomand notes: “Centralization of monarchical states reduces the degree of 
pluralism in society and increases its political fragility.  Among the political regimes of 
the modern world, monarchies are especially fragile and vulnerable to revolution.  They 
have the property of focusing discontent on a single person (1988, p. 189). 
Three principal foundations emerged, upon which were laid the state that 
subsequently emerged.  First was the shah himself.  “By installing himself at its apex and 
by making all other institutions dependent on his Court, the Shah became an integral part 
of the state” (Kamrava, p. 16).  A second basis was Iran’s administrative network, 
comprised of the cabinet, the Rastakhiz party, the Majlis, and the bureaucracy.  Third, 
“the state relied on a number of military and paramilitary institutions, the most notable of 
which were the armed forces and SAVAK” (Kamrava, p. 17).  A description of these 
foundations follows. 
 
2. The Shah 
The shah was the apex of the regime.  “The Shah himself believed that he could 
sustain the Pahlavi dynasty only if he directly intervened in the country’s political 
process.  Accordingly, the personal power of the Shah increased after 1953, while 
virtually all other institutions lost effective authority and political relevance” (Kamrava, 
p. 16).  The Shah occupied himself with running the daily affairs of the country, taking a 
special interest in the ministries of War and Foreign Affairs, the appointed leaders of 
which he met with daily.  Besides these portfolios, however, the Shah not only appointed 
his selections to ministerial, military, and ambassadorial posts, but also chaired weekly 
meetings of Iran’s High Council of Economics, “which comprised the Ministers of mines 
and industries, commerce, labour [sic], economics and financial affairs, the prime 
minister, and the heads of the central bank and the Budget Plan Organization” (Kamrava, 
p. 18).  The emerging image of the shah as a domineering micro-manager is embellished 
by his customary halo of experienced and trusted political veterans.  Although the shah 
was a yeoman-like worker, his early political experiences rendered him mistrustful of, 
and intimidated by, more experienced politicians.  Predictably, then, the shah heard only 
what his advisors thought he wanted to hear.  But more importantly, says Arjomand, “In 
curbing all independent group formation, and in following the principle of divide and rule 
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within Iranian society, the Shah failed to build a constituency capable of concerted action 
on his behalf among any major social group” (1988, p. 107). 
 
3. The Administrative Network 
The shah’s administrative network consisted chiefly of his cabinet, the Rastakhiz 
party, the majlis (or parliament) and the bureaucracy.  
a. The Cabinet   
For the greater part of the shah’s modernization program which got 
underway in the early 1960s, the cabinet’s chief function was to oversee the vast state 
bureaucracy while the shah exercised tight control over the most important ministries.  
Kamrava (p. 19) describes the various tiers of influence:  
The ministries of war, foreign affairs, the Court, and finance (whose 
minister represented Iran at OPEC) were in constant contact with the 
Shah.  The Shah also gave top priority to those ministries that were 
responsible for the economic development of the country.  Representative 
of this group were the ministries that comprised the High Council of 
Economics.  All other ministries served mere administrative functions.  
They included the ministries of culture and arts; health; housing and town 
planning; transportation; post, telephone, and telegraph; energy; 
information and tourism; justice; and the ministry of state for executive 
affairs. 
While it is not unusual for cabinet members with influential portfolios in 
any government to be in more frequent contact with the chief executive than those with 
less visible responsibilities, the extent of the shah’s control and attention rendered the 
cabinet ineffective.  
b. The Rastakhiz Party 
The single political party permitted by the shah was his own creation.  He 
dissolved Iran’s two legal parties in 1975 and replaced them with a single, all-inclusive 
party, the Rastakhiz.  The party was essentially part of the government establishment, 
despite the shah’s initial attempt to create a political body which would add legitimacy to 
his autocratic regime, as well as early support from educated Iranians.  At the beginning, 
the party was considered to be a reliable governmental organ “through which the political 
order could be gradually reformed while the general status quo was maintained.  But … 
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disenchantment with Rastakhiz soon set in as the party was bureaucratized and became 
another component of the state administration” (Kamrava, p. 21). Intellectuals became 
disillusioned with the party because it lost its original ideological appeal and came to 
symbolize the shah’s despised political structure.  The middle and upper-middle classes 
ridiculed Rastakhiz as just one more of the shah’s “deceitful gimmicks” (Kamrava, pp. 
21-22). 
c. The Majlis  
Although the Iranian government was constitutionally responsible to the 
Majlis (the parliament), after Mosaddeq was overthrown in 1953 real political power had 
steadily been transferred from the parliament to the shah’s appointed Prime Minister: 
[B]y the time Prime Minister Hoveida departed from office in 1977 the 
Majlis resembled anything but a parliament.  Neither of the chambers 
wielded any meaningful degree of influence and the activities of their 
deputies were almost exclusively limited to voicing non-political and 
regionally confined concerns of some of their constituents (Kamrava, p. 
23).   
A pattern should now be observable: neither the cabinet, nor the party, nor 
parliament was capable under the shah of representing the regime to society in a 
meaningful or sympathetic way.  Nor did these bodies facilitate a means for the true 
needs, sentiments, or grievances to reach the shah.  The institution with the best potential 
to have a finger on the pulse of Iranian society was the bureaucracy. 
d. The Bureaucracy 
“The importance of the bureaucracy to the Pahlavi state was paramount,” 
says Kamrava (p. 23).  The shah’s modernizing ambitions demanded a large number of 
government representatives to actually publicize and carry out the reforms.  To this end, 
each government ministry established offices throughout Iran.     
The Court, totalitarian and absolutist in nature, was bent on modernizing 
Iran socially and economically, but not politically.  In attempting to 
preserve his traditional centre [sic] of political authority in a rapidly 
changing transitional society, and in order to counter the image of 
despotism and oligarchy that surrounded his court, the Shah tended to put 
greater emphasis and reliance on the bureaucracy rather than the military.  
The state bureaucracy also served as a channel through which new 
members were recruited into the power elite (Kamrava, pp. 23, 24).  
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Ultimately, however, through rampant corruption39, inefficiency, 
nepotism, and unproductivity, the members of the bureaucracy became symbols of the 
shah’s apparent disregard for the masses of Iranians who had not completed the transition 
from traditional to modern society (Kamrava, p. 24). 
 
4. Military / Paramilitary Institutions 
The military and paramilitary forces over whom the shah exercised control 
consisted of the regular armed forces and SAVAK, the secret police.  Both remained 
intact and loyal to the shah until he abandoned his goal of preserving his regime and fled 
in early 1979. 
a. Armed Forces 
The Pahlavi state owed the armed forces its existence.  The first Pahlavi 
Shah came to power via a military coup, and his son recovered the throne in 1953 when 
the military helped oust Prime Minister Mosaddeq.  “By the mid-1970s, when the Shah’s 
thirty-five year reign was nearing an end, the institutions of the monarchy and the 
military were completely intertwined, and as the course of events during the revolution 
demonstrated, the strength and the survival of one directly depended on that of the other” 
(Kamrava, p. 25).  The military establishment was, consequently, the shah’s most trusted 
arm of the state.   
Although military officers enjoyed both social prestige and many 
privileges, they were beholden to the shah, who was known “to have been the ultimate 
source of authority and to have frequently given orders regarding the day-to-day running 
of the various branches” (Kamrava, p. 26).  He was also intimately involved in officers’ 
promotions (as well as their demotions if the shah saw fit).  The shah sometimes made 
senior appointments based on the personal animosity one top commander might feel 
towards another, in order to minimize the risk of collaboration against him.   “[A]rmy 
officers had a strong sense of professional identity, but no attachment to any [single] 
                                                 
39 Commercial licensing was a primary venue for corruption.  “Although legally a company did not 
need a license in order to operate, any sizeable company did need one to import, export, or deal with the 
government.  Government licenses were given out only to a few companies in each field….The need to get 
and keep a license, like many other government rules, required that top persons in a company spend much 
time in Tehran cultivating one or more leading people in order to insure the receipt of a license or other 
needed favors….[Corruption] made the culpable more subject to royal control” (Keddie, 1981, p.172).   
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social group, nor to any organized interests...They could not act against [the shah], but 
they could not act for themselves or for any other group either” (Arjomand, 1988, p. 
190).  The Army’s inability or unwillingness to act unilaterally became evident in late 
1978 as opposition demonstrations increased in intensity and the shah vacillated between 
repression and accommodation.  Through it all, and despite outrage among some 
generals, the Army remained intact, suffering relatively few defections or incidents of 
sabotage against the regime (Arjomand, pp. 119-21).   
b. SAVAK  
The Iranian security apparatus, SAVAK, was established by the shah in 
1957 as a bulwark against what he called ‘anti-state’ activists, both domestic and abroad.  
Besides a reported counter-intelligence role against Soviet spies in Iran, SAVAK had two 
main functions: “the identification and often the arrest of ‘anti-state elements’, especially 
members of the two guerrilla organizations, the [Mojahedin] and the Fedaiyan; and the 
placement of operatives within the bureaucracy to prevent the state’s infiltration by those 
not loyal to the Crown” (Kamrava, p. 27).  SAVAK was remarkably successful in their 
brutal and ubiquitous efforts to suppress the Iranian opposition.  Iranian society, however, 
feared and/or loathed SAVAK—its personnel were favorite targets for reprisal as the 
revolution escalated. 
The regime’s shallow foundation of power was revealed as 1978 
progressed.  Arjomand (1988) describes a neo-patrimonial state as characteristically 
fragile because “government is extremely personal and the chief executive encourages 
divisions within the army and the political elite in order to rule.  Such neo-patrimonial 
states are particularly prone to collapse and ensuing revolution once the ruler breaks 
down” (pp. 189-90).  Thus, as tensions mounted, the shah vacillated, and the radical 
clerics gained an unmistakable advantage, the shah removed the sycophantic prime 
minister, Hoveida, and replaced him with Jamshid Amuzegar.  The new prime minister 
attempted to solve the crisis through technical solutions and did little to engage the 
increasingly vocal opposition (Kamrava, p. 29).  Amuzegar proved ineffective at keeping 
Khomeini and the emerging opposition from exploiting and compounding the systemic 
flaws in the system.  On top of the negative cycle of events internally, the Iranian regime 
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was deflated by a prolonged decline in oil prices as well as the Carter administration’s 
abandonment of the ‘Nixon Doctrine’40.  Thus, as both internal and external pressures 
mounted, the state’s utter dependence on the personality of the shah, his continued 
presence, his state of mind, and his decrees became obvious.  The shah’s self-imposed 
micro-management of the state was also evident as the state’s administrative apparatus 
devolved into chaos, “embodying an uncoordinated cabinet, a farcical political party, a 
symbolic parliament, and an inept and overgrown bureaucracy” (Kamrava, p. 30).   
The two key observations in the preceding discussion are, (1) the shah 
made himself an integral part of the state; and (2) the state utterly relied on his presence 
in order to function.  The shah was, in effect, a single point of failure for the state.  
Moreover, the shah had very little insight or connections into other power centers in 
Iran—the informal networks of the mosque and bazaar—dismissing such power centers 
as anachronisms. Iran’s rentier economy (see Figure 4) did not produce natural linkages 
between state and society.  Nor does the evidence suggest that the shah was in any way 
attempting or intending to implement a robust tax-collection scheme—creating an 
extractive state (accountable to society) would have run counter to one of the shah’s main 
goals: regime preservation.  The shah could not, however, reconcile this goal with his 
other main ambition: modernization.  
Unfortunately for the shah, it was the very institutions of modernizing 
government—bureaucratic ministries; the army; and his legendary secret police, SAVAK 
(Denoeux, p. 128)—and the enforcement of modernizing policies, which aggrieved the 
population and added power to the opposition through informal networks.  Chapter II’s 
description of Iran’s bazaar and mosque networks showed that the shah’s ultimate demise 
was connected to his...  
failure to rely on effective political organizations and/or well-established 
patronage networks…to provide a bridge between the regime and the 
urban population, and to compensate for the absence of formally 
                                                 
40 In May 1972 Nixon visited Iran and, as part of a post-Vietnam foreign policy strategy which relied 
on regional “pillars” (instead of US expeditionary forces) to secure American interests, informed the Shah 
that the US was prepared to sell him ‘any conventional weapons systems it wanted’.  “This signaled the 
emergence of more complex relations between the two states,” according to Bashiriyeh (p. 35).  The other 
regional pillar, incidentally, was Saudi Arabia. 
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organized political groups binding the monarchy to the modern middle 
class, the bazaari and religious communities, the working class, and 
uprooted peasants (Denoeux, p. 102). 
Gause (1992, p. 461) contends that “increased state capacity is not a 
foolproof guarantee of regime stability.  The increasing role of the state can politicize 
people in opposition to regimes.”  The Iranian case bears him out.   
 
D. STRUCTURE OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN STATE 
If Iran’s revolution was a function of the regime’s lack of integration with society, 
the obvious question with regard to contemporary Saudi Arabia is how well the Saudi 
regime is integrated with Saudi society.  Although Saudi Arabia is somewhat similar to 
the shah’s Iran—it is also a distributive state, and is undergoing rapid urbanization—the 
Al Saud have forged connections with Saudi society which shield it from the institutional 
vulnerability of the shah’s regime.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has its own unique 
historical and social context within which the regime exists and functions.  Two other 




The Saudi context is shaped by the kingdom’s short modern history and its 
society, including tribal ties and the dominant role of Islam. These factors in turn affect 
both the ends sought by the regime, and the means by which the regime seeks to achieve 
them. 
a. History   
Three aspects of Saudi Arabia’s history bear mention: conquest by the Al 
Saud, the discovery of oil, and the formation of the Saudi nation state. 
Whereas Iran has an extensive history as an ancient civilization, Saudi 
Arabia as it is known today was unified only in the 1920s, under Abd al Aziz, a member 
of the Al Saud family and a descendant of Muhammad ibn Saud—the Al Saud sheikh 
who first conquered parts of the Arabian Peninsula in the eighteenth century.  From exile 
in Kuwait Abd al Aziz began his conquest of the al Rashid tribe, beginning in the Najd—
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a central desert region of the Arabian Peninsula and the traditional homeland of the Al 
Saud.  Over time Abd al Aziz conquered most of the Arabian Peninsula (calling this 
territory Saudi Arabia) and asserting his leadership over Saudi Arabia’s tribes.  Unlike 
the shah, therefore, the Al Saud had no legacy besides conquest on which to justify their 
monarchy, leaving them in search of legitimacy. 
Oil has also affected Saudi Arabia only recently.  In 1938, shortly after 
Abd al Aziz formed the nation, and while the Saudi population was still small and 
pastoral, American geologists discovered oil. Oil not only transformed the Saudi state 
financial system into a modern, rentier economy, but also fundamentally altered Saudi 
society by undercutting tribes’ economic autonomy.   
The rebuilding of Europe after World War II and its need for cheap, 
reliable sources of oil greatly enhanced the position of the newly 
established Saudi Arabian oil industry. The quantum jump in revenues that 
flowed into the treasury of Abd al Aziz…fortified his position and allowed 
the king to exert greater political and economic control over the territories 
he had conquered. At the apex of the economy was the state with all the 
mechanisms needed to ensure the rule of [Al Saud]. The state became the 
widespread agent of economic change, replacing the traditional economy 
with one that depended primarily on the state's outlays (U.S. Library of 
Congress, 2005). 
As noted in the previous discussion, a major weakness of a rentier 
economy is that it does not foster strong integrating ties between the state and society.   
State-building is always messy.  Europe’s’ nation states, for example, took 
centuries to develop, and began with forceful conquest.  In the beginning, then, state 
legitimacy derives from the state’s coercive power.  Over time, though, legitimacy 
develops as the state proves able to protect and provide for its citizens.  The state’s ability 
to do so, however, depends on access to resources.  These resources must either be 
extracted from the citizens, or, as in the Saudi case with the discovery of oil, abundantly 
available and controllable by the state.  In either case a bureaucracy is required, either to 
extract taxes or to distribute received rents.  While Europe’s states had centuries to 
develop, nations which come late to the game, so to speak, typically have their 
development interrupted, influenced, and intervened upon by outside forces (Lustick, 
1997).  Despite keen external interest in Saudi Arabia’s oil from the industrialized world, 
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however, the Al Saud have succeeded far more than other Middle Eastern states in 
insulating the kingdom from western influence.  Even so, Saudi Arabia’s rapid ascent 
from being a desert wasteland inhabited by nomads to global economic prominence 
shapes the context in which the regime operates because the Al Saud had to structure the 
state being mindful of both its conservative, traditional society and the modern, 
cosmopolitan outside world. 
b. Saudi Society   
Despite the intrusion of a modern economy and the introduction of a 
central, patronistic government, Saudi society is in many ways still very traditional.  The 
social context in which the regime operates is affected chiefly by Islam and tribal ties.   
Islam is central both to Saudi society and to the regime’s legitimacy.  The 
latter is a significant difference between the Saudi and Iranian cases.  In the latter, the 
Shi’ite hierocracy was effectively autonomous from the state.  As demonstrated in 
Chapter II, autonomy was a critical factor in the clerics’ leadership in the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution.  The Saudi religious establishment is wholly different, and has been so since 
Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a puritanical scholar of 
Islamic jurisprudence, met in the Arabian desert in the eighteenth century.  Wahhabi 
doctrine stated that Muslims “must present a bayah, or oath of allegiance, to a Muslim 
ruler during his lifetime to ensure his redemption after death. The ruler, conversely, is 
owed unquestioned allegiance from his people so long as he leads the community 
according to the laws of God” (U.S. Library of Congress, 2005).  The alliance formed 
between the two men essentially secured Saudi patronage of Abd al-Wahhab in exchange 
for the political legitimacy afforded by the latter’s doctrine.  Thus, centuries later, 
“specific Islamic themes are an integral part of the ruling ideology, stemming from the 
historic alliance between Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 
1745.  Saudi rulers have continued to affirm the importance of this ideological basis for 
their rule, even as they have endeavored to bring the ulama more and more under state 
control” (Gause, 1994, p. 29).  As Gause also notes (1994, p. 31), however, appropriating 
Islam to secure legitimacy makes it easy for opponents to point out where the rulers fall 
short of the strict, but self-imposed, Islamic standards the rulers promote.  Islam also 
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shapes the political context because, although the Saudi monarchy is absolute, “their 
power [is] tempered by Islamic law (sharia) and by the custom of reaching consensus on 
political issues among the scores of direct adult male descendants of Abd al Aziz” (U.S. 
Library of Congress, 2005). 
Although oil revenue enabled Abd al Aziz to undermine the traditional 
client-patron relationships that shaped traditional-Saudi society, tribal identity remains 
pivotal in tying together the Saudi state and society.  These relationships emerged from 
frequent raids, which conferred status on successful tribes and also served as a 
mechanism for economic distribution.  Weaker tribes sometimes sought protection from 
stronger tribes, establishing a patron-client relationship in which the protector obliged 
himself to spare the protected tribe’s property and protect it from other raiders.   The 
protector, moreover, could only secure his influence among his own tribe by distributing 
the protection-payment to his fellow tribesmen.  “These client-patron relationships based 
on payment of protection money were undermined by Abd al Aziz in the 1920s when he 
released weaker tribes from obligations to stronger ones and made himself the sole source 
of wealth redistributed from the spoils of raiding, and then later from oil profits” (U.S. 
Library of Congress, 2005).  
The Saudi regime is acutely aware of the state’s power centers, appointing 
members of the vast royal family to positions of influence in the capital, the provinces, 
and in most government ministries.  While the system achieves the regime’s desire for 
stability, the system also lends itself to administrative inefficiency and also presents 
appointees with easy avenues to corruption and abuse of power.  “Beneath the major 
princes, thousands of second generation and minor royal family members also have 
claims on the system and in many cases use state mechanisms to achieve or enhance 
personal interests” (ICG, 2004a).  The early alliance between the political and religious 
founders of Saudi Arabia is reflected in the appointment of members of the Al al-Shaykh 
family41 to positions of prominence as the justice minister and as mufti, the country’s 
highest religious authority (ICG, 2004a).  
                                                 
41 The descendents of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab are known as the Al al-Shaykh 
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The two remaining elements of the Saudi political context are the regime’s 
ends and means.  The former will be addressed briefly here, and a discussion of the 
state’s means for achieving its goals follows later.  The regime’s goals are difficult to 
accurately discern.  This is not for lack of published plans with respect to the economy, 
counter-terrorism, or municipal elections, but rather because the pronouncements of the 
state are, often enough, based more on political expediency than intended action.  The 
regime’s true intentions, on the other hand, remain opaque to both the average Saudi and 
the foreign observer.  “We won’t ever know the inner workings of the Saudi decision 
process,” says Judith Kipper (2005b) of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).  Several 
notable observers, moreover, conclude that “Those who know aren’t talking, and those 
who are talking don’t know”42.  Clearly, however, the first, and overarching, goal of the 
regime must be survival—maintaining the monarchy in the Al Saud family.  The second 
goal, closely tied to the first, appears to be to maintain the political status quo, giving up 
absolute power (through democratic reforms or otherwise) only incrementally43 and only 
in the interest of the first goal.  The Al Saud are not in danger of being voted out of 
office, or (since Saddam Hussein’s demise) of being invaded by an external force, but the 
regime appears to recognize that the status quo demands a reciprocal commitment to 
maintain the Islamic character of the Kingdom and to meet the needs of ordinary Saudis.  
These aspects of legitimacy are embodied in the Saudi regime structure, which can be 
described by two complementary characteristics: a powerful monarchy and state 
patronage.   
 
2. A Powerful Monarchy 
“Autocracy”, or “absolute monarchy,” as understood in the west, may well be 
misnomers when describing the Saudi monarchy.  To be sure, the king is the ultimate 
source of state power and the royal family has great authority and freedom of action.  But 
the regime’s power is limited “by other power centers within the royal family, by 
                                                 
42 Based on conversations with Gregory Gause, Judith Kipper, Anthony Cordesman, and Toby Jones 
(of the International Crisis Group) in May, 2005. 
43 Promised reforms often either don’t occur at all in the Kingdom, or take place at a glacial pace, 
leading Judith Kipper to comment that, “Doing nothing is doing something in Saudi Arabia” (2005a and 
2005b). 
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religion, by custom, and by the need for [a] high degree of consensus within Saudi 
Arabia’s key tribes, technocrats, business leaders, and religious figures.  The Saud 
family…has long had to seek to achieve and preserve a broad social and political 
consensus” (Cordesman, 2002).   
The tribal leader, the shaykh44, governs by consensus. Shaykhs acquire 
influence through their ability to mediate disputes and persuade their peers 
toward a given course of action. The qualities their position demands are a 
detailed grasp of tribal affairs, a reputation for giving good advice, and 
generosity. Shaykhs are essentially arbitrators; the process of resolving 
disputes reflects the tribe's egalitarian ethos. Shaykhs do not lead 
discussions but carefully ascertain everyone's opinion on a given question. 
Consensus is necessary before action is taken. To force a decision is to 
undermine one's influence; leaders are effective only as long as they 
conform to the tribe's expectations (U.S. Library of Congress, 2005). 
So, while one is tempted to attach the descriptor “mere” to an advisory body like 
the majlis-ash-shura, the majlis actually carries some weight.  “Its ability to act as an 
informal check also reflects the fact that the system prizes consensus, strives to maintain 
harmony through consultation and is deeply averse to conflict” (ICG, 2004a).  The 
International Crisis Group report continues with an example of the “mere” advisory 
group’s ability to shape government policy, in which a member of the majlis relates: “We 
have an understanding with the government.  As long as there is no financial 
transparency, and we don’t have all the facts [about the financial affairs of the state], if 
they come to us asking for taxes or levies, we say no.” 
The result is that “the Saudi monarchy consists more of patriarchal rule by a 
consensus-driven extended family with large numbers of alliances to other families, than 
rule by an autocrat who acts upon his personal desires” (Cordesman, 2002).  The Saudi 
regime therefore pays attention to its citizens, but still brooks no opposition from them.  
Gause (2002) asks, concerning the strength and stability of an autocratic regime, why the 
Saudis bother with public opinion.  He concludes that the Saudis “surf their public 
opinion more out of their desire to avoid creating unnecessary problems than fear that an 
unpopular decision could mean their downfall.”  While consensual leadership imposes 
                                                 
44 Alternatively spelled “sheikh.” 
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some restraint on the regime’s power, it also confers upon the Saudi rulers a considerable 
amount of popular legitimacy.   
While legitimacy has a powerful impact on the Saudi regime’s survivability, the 
royal family also exerts firm control over all arms of the state.45  Gause (1992, pp. 461-
62) writes: 
 [I]ncreased state capacity since 1970 has helped stabilize regimes in the 
Arab world, making them less susceptible to pressure based on 
transnational ideological challenges generated from abroad….The avenues 
of political change in the Middle East now seem limited to internal 
processes of reform or revolution.  Coup, conspiracy and transnational 
ideological pressure can no longer alter regimes. 
Control over state institutions, according to Quinlavan, enables a ruler to “coup-
proof” a regime; i.e. structure it in such a way as to “minimize the possibilities of small 
groups leveraging the system” to seize the state (Quinlavan, 1999).  This “coup-proofed” 
structure consists of five general characteristics, a discussion of which entails a 
description of various arms of the state to include administrative, military, and security 
functions. 
(1) Effective exploitation of family, ethnic, and religious loyalties for coup-
critical positions balanced with wider participation and less restrictive loyalty standards 
for the regime as a whole.  Since the Al Saud cannot possibly staff entire bureaucracies or 
armies with members of their immediate tribe, and because Saudi leadership depends on 
consensus, the ruling family’s ability to foster and maintain a complex balance of 
personal, tribal, religious, and dynastic interests is critical.  Ibn Saud set the precedent 
when he conquered Arabia using the unlikely combination of a small force of tribal 
warriors, and arranged marriages.  “Marriage, even to bereaved relatives of defeated 
opponents, provided Ibn Saud an effective means of monitoring his enemies.  The tribes 
of the [Najd] made up the human core of Saudi Arabia, while Ibn Saud’s numerous 
                                                 
45 This includes the religious establishment.  Dependent to a degree on the clerics for their Islamic 
credentials, the Al Saud have nevertheless established supremacy over the ulama, dating back to the late 
1920’s, when ibn Saud45 rallied “loyal tribesmen and townsmen to put down a revolt among his 
“Wahhabi” shock troops.  Abd al-Aziz’s success in a series of battles against them established the primacy 
of his family’s rule over those who advocated an unlimited jihad to spread “Wahhabi” doctrine” (Gause, 
2002).   
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progeny comprised the dynasty’s human core.  Today the Al Saud rule from a base within 
a family group that is not monolithic” (Quinlavan, p. 138).   
(2) Creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military.  The function of 
the parallel military is to protect the regime by providing a counterweight to the regular 
armed forces which are most likely to be involved in a coup—a praetorian guard, as it 
were.  The parallel force must therefore be tightly bound to the regime.  The Saudi 
embodiment of this coup-proofing mechanism is the Saudi National Guard (SANG), 
commanded by King Abdullah.  While the regular Saudi armed forces (commanded not-
incidentally by another family member, Prince Sultan, the Defense Minister) are 
composed of men from diverse tribal and regional backgrounds, the SANG is composed 
of troops from the same tribes that fought with Ibn Saud in 1929 against the rest of the 
Ikhwan—the previously referenced Wahhabi shock troops who originally helped Ibn 
Saud conquer the Arabian Peninsula but who revolted against his later attempts to 
restrain their traditional raiding prerogatives.  The regular forces are garrisoned and 
trained to interdict external invaders, while the SANG are purpose-built for defending the 
royal family and are even garrisoned between the capital and the regular military 
(Quinlavan, p. 144). 
(3) Development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping 
jurisdiction.  The creation of internal security organizations which might report on each 
other ensures that the various services are both active and loyal to the regime.  Saudi 
Arabia has established three such organs: the Ministry of the Interior, under the 
leadership of a family member, Prince Naif; the SANG (see above); and the independent 
religious police, regulated by the clerical establishment (which is funded, in turn, by the 
state).  The regime thus controls, directly or indirectly, all the levers of internal security 
from local police in urban areas to border patrol units on the periphery of the state 
(Quinlavan, p. 149). 
(4) Fostering of expertness in the regular military.  The regime clearly has an 
interest in having a well trained praetorian guard.  What is less obvious with regard to a 
potential military coup is the regime’s need for a technically skilled regular military.  The 
reason for this is that it is in the regime’s interest for the regular officers to have the 
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technical skills necessary to make a realistic, worst-case assessment of the combat power 
and coordination that would be required to overcome the praetorian guard because, “as 
the number of units required to execute a coup increases, so does the probability that they 
will be uncovered” by one or more of the aforementioned internal security agencies 
(Quinlavan, p. 153).   
(5) Financing the above measures.  The fifth characteristic of Saudi coup-
proofing requires singular attention below in a discussion of Saudi state patronage.   
The Al Saud have mastered coup-proofing.  The shah, on the other hand, had 
neither family, ethnic, nor religious ties to most of the people he placed in positions of 
power in his government.  To be sure, he was removed from power by a full-fledged 
revolution and not a coup, but neither the administrative network nor the armed forces 
upon which his state was based were staffed with people whose loyalty the shah could 
guarantee.  This weakness was painfully evident as the revolution matured. 
 
3. State Patronage 
Saudi Arabia is a rentier (or distributive) state—and the regime can afford to 
implement all the above measures because it is the sole distributor of Saudi oil revenues.  
The royal family has succeeded in making Saudi power centers dependent on the Al 
Saud: tribal authority, the religious establishment, commercial interests, and the 
population at large.   
The regime’s ability to co-opt Arabian tribal power centers is discussed above. 
Whether the Al Saud can continue indefinitely to rely on tribal affiliations to tie together 
state and society in the event of a prolonged crisis in rents is debatable.  Even when the 
modern world was not impinging on Saudi society, these ties were in flux. “The 
vicissitudes of time, the history of tribal migrations, the tendency of groups to segment 
into smaller units, the adoption of client tribes by those stronger, a smaller tribe's use of 
the name of one more illustrious--all tend to make tenuous the tie between actual descent 
and the publicly accepted view of genealogy” (U.S. Library of Congress, 2005).   
Urbanization on the scale experienced by Saudi Arabia in recent decades is 
another factor which weakens tribal bonds by replacing the tribal patron with various 
 80
state agencies which sustain and regulate civic life.  Economic realities since the 
discovery of oil also have a deleterious effect on the importance of tribal affiliations 
because, “rulers, through the new mechanism of the state, [could] appeal directly to 
tribesmen, without the mediating figure of the shaykh” (Gause, 1994, p. 23).  The regime, 
moreover, no longer has to rely on tribal groupings for financial support.  Instead, the 
rulers had money to give away, or to bargain away in return for political loyalty.  
Physical and economic security thus came from the state.  Tribal sheikhs became, 
effectively, salaried employees of the state, although the tribe still retains a great deal of 
power in the social arena (Gause, 1994, p. 23). 
The Saudi regime relies on the Wahhabi establishment for a significant degree of 
its political legitimacy.  The Al Saud sustain the original compact by continuing to fund 
the sprawling religious bureaucracy and publicly observing the kind of Islam 
promulgated by the clerics.   This mutually beneficial relationship has endured since the 
original pact in the 18th century: “the political fortunes of the [Al Saud] family have been 
tied to [Al Wahhab’s] austere and puritanical interpretation of Islam,” says Gause, 2002).     
The ‘ulama … were the pillars of early Saudi administration, acting as 
judges, tax collectors and military recruiters.  With the advent of oil 
wealth in the second half of the twentieth century, Saudi rulers created a 
vast system of mosques, schools and universities operated by the ‘ulama, 
large bureaucracies staffed by them (including the Saudi ministries of 
justice and pilgrimage affairs and the women’s education system), and 
international and non-governmental organizations … to promote the 
spread of their interpretation of Islam (Gause, 2002). 
The Al Saud have clearly reaped the benefits of Wahhabi doctrine, which requires 
obedience to the ruler who himself adheres to the doctrine.  The clerics, in return, have 
routinely supported the ruling family and opposed those who sought to change the 
political order.  “The higher ranks of the ‘ulama have regularly issued 
fatawa46…condemning the domestic enemies of the Al Saud, ratifying transfers of power 
within the family, and supporting the policy choices of the rulers” (Gause, 2002).   
The official religious establishment—whose clerics are on the government 
payroll—is sometimes seen by the average Saudi as a mere arm of the state, whereas 
                                                 
46 Fatawa: plural of fatwa, or religious judgment. 
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clerics who are willing to speak out against the regime are afforded much greater popular 
credibility (ICG, 2004).  Repeatedly, however, as seen in the wake of 9/11, these same 
clerics have been persuaded to either publicly recant or to otherwise come around to 
support the regime47.   
The regime’s patronage is a major factor in the Saudi economy.  Commenting on 
the economies of the Gulf’s rentier states in general, Gause (1994) states that government 
control of oil revenues (its collection, distribution, and resulting purchasing power) has 
enormous political consequences because it is the government, not the market or 
regulatory bodies that determine the fortunes of Saudi businessmen:  
It is impossible to succeed in business without the tacit, if not active, 
approval of the political elite.  The economic levers in the hands of 
governments are such that they can irreparably harm any individual or 
firm perceived to be disloyal or dangerous.  Conversely, governments can 
handsomely reward those in favor, and can even create socioeconomic 
interest groups that then become supporters of their regimes … the costs 
of active political opposition to these governments are extremely high (p. 
58). 
The regime shows signs of becoming aware that the Saudi economy must become 
diversified in order for the state to remain solvent in the long term and stable in the event 
of a prolonged crisis in oil rents combined with troubling demographic trends.  Reform 
has never taken place quickly in the Kingdom, however, so for the time being, “economic 
interests are vested in the state” (Gause, 1994, p. 58). 
Another collective recipient of Saudi state patronage is the Saudi population.  The 
regime is tied to its citizens by means of free or heavily subsidized housing, water, 
education, food, as well as employment.  “Provision of all these economic benefits has a 
clear political intent: to convince the citizenry that their personal well-being is tied up 
with the existing political system” (Gause, 1994, pp. 61-63).  The Saudi welfare state 
emerged in the wake of the 1970s oil boom.  It created “a new life-style; the Saudi people 
who had previously lived an often difficult life sustained by hard work came to rely on 
                                                 
47 See Chapter Two for a more detailed description of the Islamist opposition.  Although the religious 
establishment can readily be considered as part of the state structure, I include it in Chapter Two because 
the mosque is the only avenue of real political expression in a repressive regime. 
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welfare and on millions of foreign workers to fill both manual and skilled jobs” 
(Cordesman, as quoted by ICG, 2004a).  This new life style, however, was sustainable at 
a certain minimum oil price, and for a certain population threshold.  Oil prices, though, 
are subject to volatile market fluctuations, and the population is (literally) a growing 
problem for the Saudi government.  The Saudi population has tripled since the oil boom, 
and “government services have been unable to keep up … Demographic projections 
portend more serious strains on the state and economy” (ICG, 2004a).   
State patronage is thus a two-sided coin.  The Saudi government is beginning to 
address demographic problems, but if the solutions are enacted in typically glacial 
fashion while population growth and unemployment rates continue to gallop, the 
problems have the potential to erode the regime’s legitimacy.  This is so because the 
government has so far refused calls from all ranks of reformers for fiscal accountability 
with regard to oil revenues, government spending, military expenditures, and stipends 
paid to members of the royal family.  The last point is the most critical to the regime’s 
legitimacy: while ordinary Saudis see their standard of living declining, it is widely 
known that thousands of princes in the vast royal family enjoy profligate lifestyles (ICG, 
2004a).  This undermines confidence between the state and society—the very ties that the 
regime otherwise works hard and spends lavishly to establish and sustain. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
The purpose of examining the structures of the Iranian and Saudi regimes is to 
discern similarities or differences between the two which would suggest whether there is 
any substance to some commentators’ suggestions that Saudi Arabia suffers from a 
structural weakness which places it in danger of following Iran down a revolutionary 
path, or that the Al Saud are in danger of being overthrown the moment an organized 
opposition forms.  I find that whereas the Iranian state under the Shah was completely 
dependent on his personality, weakly integrated with society, and out of touch with 
ordinary Iranians, the Al Saud are less autocratic than paternalistic and are thus well 
integrated with Saudi society.  They control state revenues, enabling them to build an 
extensive patronage system, which simultaneously prevents the rise of a financially 
autonomous opposition group.   
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In the near term, given oil prices lingering well over sixty dollars per barrel, the 
Saudi regime will remain stable.  In a distributive state, however, control of resources 
does not necessarily confer legitimacy on those with their hands on the levers.  If a 
prolonged crisis in rents ensued the Al Saud could, as in the past, rely not only on the 
fragile power of patronage, but also on tribal ties and the endorsement of the religious 
establishment to justify their continued rule.  These ties, however, are not monolithic, and 
the long term solution of establishing state-society integration based on taxation and 
government accountability will undoubtedly be difficult.  “Reforms in authoritarian 
regimes never derive from the impulsive noble motivations of autocratic rulers. 
International efforts to promote the cause of democracy in countries where the tradeoffs 
of undemocratic governance continue to be bearable for the ruling elites are bound to 
fail,” warns Amr Hamzawy (2005).  Cordesman suggests a less pessimistic view: in light 
of the strong Saudi tradition of monarchical accessibility, and the fact that Saudi rulers 
have long cultivated patriarchal ties which integrate state and society, Saudi Arabia 
















IV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. FINDINGS 
Iran’s Islamic Revolution shook both the Middle East and the United States.  It 
also took most international observers by surprise.  Some credible voices are raising the 
prospect today of Saudi Arabia being the next Middle Eastern pillar to be swept away by 
a radical Islamic tide.  Does this assertion stand up under scrutiny of the structural 
strengths and weaknesses of the two states and their opponents?  The conclusion I arrive 
at is that the Saudi royal family is very unlikely to be toppled in the manner of the Shah 
of Iran, because the Al Saud are more integrated with society than their opponents: the 
Saudi opposition either supports the royal family, or is marginalized within society.  The 
Shah, on the other hand, had very weak ties to Iranian society, while the Iranian 
opposition under Khomeini was deeply rooted and connected with ordinary Iranians.   
To arrive at such a conclusion one must first have established that although there 
are stark dissimilarities between the two countries and political situations, the two are 
indeed comparable.  In the introductory chapter we dispensed with some of the 
dissimilarities which might lead someone to dismiss the comparison outright.  Cosmetic 
differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia—religious, social-ethnic, and era—were 
acknowledged, but shown not to preclude a meaningful comparison.  The fact that Iran 
experienced the only Islamic revolution to date, and the similarities between the two—
both countries had revolutionary underpinnings, both are regional heavyweights, and both 
regimes relied/rely for their survival on popular legitimacy—bolster the relevance of the 
comparison.   
Chapters II and III advanced the comparison, evaluating the structural strengths 
and weaknesses of the regimes and opposition elements respectively.  The conclusion 
above is based on substantial structural differences between the two situations.  Whereas 
the Shah and his regime were out of touch with ordinary Iranians, Saudi royal influence 
permeates society via Al Saud patronage.  Whereas the Iranian government relied heavily 
on the person and presence of the Shah, the Saudi government has, by all indications, 
seamlessly transferred power to Crown Prince Abdullah upon the death of King Fahd.  
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Whereas the Shah was unable to orchestrate compromise with his opponents, the Al Saud 
consistently demonstrate their ability to bring even their fiercest critics on side over time.  
Where Khomeini was able through informal networks to channel deep societal passions 
against the shah, al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) and exiled critics remain 
marginalized among Saudis, and the rest of the Saudi opposition professes loyalty to the 
Al Saud.  The major findings of this thesis are summarized below: 
• Iran and Saudi Arabia are dissimilar, but comparable.  Persian, Shi’a, 
1970s Iran is clearly not Arab, Sunni, contemporary Saudi Arabia.  But it is worthwhile 
to study the single example of an Islamic Revolution in light of the many cautionary 
statements published regarding Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability to the same.  Moreover, both 
countries were/are key regional allies of the United States; both were/are important oil 
exporters; and both rely on their popular appeal for political legitimacy. 
• Iran’s opposition was highly integrated in society, but the Shah’s 
regime was not.  The shah fundamentally misread the true source of effective opposition 
to his regime: the forces gathered in the informal networks of the bazaar and mosque and 
manipulated by militant clerics.  He equated opposition organizations with opposition 
forces, and therefore relied on modern, and formal, organizations (SAVAK, the 
bureaucracy, and the army) to control the booming, politicized urban population 
(Denoeux, 1993, p. 128).  Having successfully co-opted, eclipsed or repressed opposition 
organizations such as the National Front, Tudeh, and labor unions, he assumed his work 
was done.  But the fatal missing-ingredient in the Shah’s regime structure was “the 
Shah’s failure to rely on effective political organizations and/or well-established 
patronage networks “to provide a bridge between the regime and the urban population, 
and to compensate for the absence of formally organized political groups binding the 
monarchy to the modern middle class, the bazaari and religious communities, the 
working class, and uprooted peasants” (Denoeux, 1993, p. 102). 
• The Al Saud are well integrated with society, but the violent 
opposition is not.  Saudi Arabia’s opposition groups are not, except for QAP, interested 
in overthrowing the regime.  QAP is marginalized within Saudi society (although no 
definitive data exists to indicate what level of tacit support might exist in the population, 
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the government, or Saudi security forces).  The Al Saud are well connected to society 
through vast patronage networks.  They also recognize the royal imperative to stay 
connected to Saudi society.  As (then) Crown Prince Abdullah acknowledges, “Those 
governments that don’t feel the pulse of the people and respond to it will suffer the fate of 
the Shah of Iran” (Dorsey, 2001).  Additionally, King Abdullah is widely respected for 
his piety and for his stance against royal corruption and profligacy.48 
• There is a notable absence of anthropological data on Saudi informal 
networks.  This is a consequential absence given the fact that informal networks are far 
more likely to produce a charismatic leader and a popular groundswell of opposition 
activity than a state-funded institution.  Additionally, if such a movement were to arise, it 
would be less likely to the surprise with which the Iranian Islamic Revolution took the 
vast majority of western observers —if a way can be found to address it,  
None of this should lead the reader to believe that threats to the Saudi status quo 
are nonexistent.  The Saudi regime certainly faces considerable challenges—the power of 
patronage ebbs and flows with the price of oil; the regime is under domestic and 
international pressure to relinquish power to a more representative government and/or 
establish a constitutional monarchy; and the Iraq war may be the training ground for a 
new generation of Saudi Mujahideen.  But these threats exist in the medium to long term, 
and are not dissimilar to threats the Al Saud have weathered in the past.   
Some significant questions nevertheless remain.  Chiefly, can the Al Saud 
indefinitely prevent violent opposition groups and/or forces from moving away from the 
margins of society to a central and powerful position?  Secondly, remember that 
Khomeini was also a marginal figure, even within the Iranian clergy, so what keeps QAP 
from gaining popular legitimacy?  Both of these questions could be helpfully addressed if 
some detail of Saudi informal networks were known.  Since, as has already been noted, 
the Al Saud take few actions quickly, it is quite unlikely that they will suddenly 
discontinue in the long term the counter-opposition tactics that are proving so effective in 
                                                 
48 Walter Lippman, a longtime observer of Saudi Arabia and the Middle East, says, “King Abdullah 
has not been personally tainted by allegations of corruption. He is emblematic of traditional Bedouin values 
in a rapidly urbanizing society and is seen to have the stature and integrity among the populace to carry out 
the much-needed reform” (Lippman, 2005). 
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the short term.  Therefore, some idea of the action channels and seats of informal power 
in Saudi society would provide valuable insight into those factors which affect whatever 
popular momentum QAP might be able to gain.  That same knowledge would be 
indispensable for discovering early those potential opposition leaders whose charisma 
might persuade fence-sitting Saudis—those who approve of jihadist rhetoric but reject 
violent tactics—to either join or support QAP or other such organizations which might 
emerge.  Again, the likelihood of instability accompanying the eventual return of Saudi 
anti-coalition fighters in Iraq should place a premium on the knowledge of Saudi 




The fact that the Iranian Islamic Revolution was a strategic surprise suggests that 
those responsible for evaluating the Iranian situation and making US policy decisions in 
1978-79 were either not watching or not believing the right indicators.  We now enjoy the 
luxury of hindsight in the Iranian case, but the fact remains that the Carter administration 
was unprepared to deal with such a rapidly evolving scenario.  In order to avoid, or at 
least mitigate, a similar strategic surprise in Saudi Arabia, I advocate an Indications and 
Warning (I&W) problem which is based upon those conditions which cause informal 
networks to change from being system-supportive to system-challenging, as proposed by 
Guilain Denoeux (1993): 
1. When a weakening (by internal division, military defeat, policy failure, etc.) 
regime is no longer able to keep its end of the bargain by providing favors to the 
patrons and security to the population 
2. When clients exert pressure on local leaders to become involved on their side if 
the government threatens the interests of substantial segments of the urban 
population 
3. When notables (i.e. channels through which state patronage is dispensed) 
themselves feel their interests and powers threatened by a regime’s policies or 
“the emergence of alternative sources of patronage that threatened to attract their 
clienteles” (Denoeux, 1988, p. 53). 
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Equal attention should be paid to those factors which enable opposition leaders to 
mobilize effectively against the state: 
1. Resources at opposition’s disposal—three types: 
a. Financial independence from the government 
b. Organizational independence from the government 
c. Social influence: control over extensive social networks 
2. Opposition leader feels his existence, values, or way of life threatened by hostile 
forces perceived to be associated with the authorities.   
3. Opposition leader benefits from a weak, suddenly weakened, or indecisive central 
authority. 
As discussed, the distributive Saudi state does not facilitate fiscal, organizational, 
or social independence.  Nor is the Saudi state weak—the smooth succession of Abdullah 
demonstrates this well—leaving only the second factor at large.  Al Qaeda acolytes 
certainly proclaim that their way of life and their values, embodied in Islam, are being 
threatened and corrupted by the “Jews and Crusaders” with whom the Al Saud associate.  
Most of Saudi society, however, accepts the Al Saud as the legitimate defenders of both 
Saudi Arabia and Islam.   
Clearly an I&W system based on informal-network dynamics would have to 
address one of the findings of this thesis: the absence of detailed information about the 
nature, personalities and action channels of Saudi informal networks.  Some degree of 
awareness is still possible by using I&W tippers which would reveal significant changes 
to the structures of both the Saudi regime and the opposition.  These changes would be 
reflected or suggested by: 
• Repeated demonstrations that Saudi clerics and Friday prayer leaders 
become willing to verbally oppose the regime (LaPointe, 2005). 
• Willingness of political and/or social reformists to openly criticize the 
regime despite the threat of detention. 
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• Indications of open tension among the senior members of the royal 
family.49  
• Surveys which indicate rising support for both ideology and actions of al 
Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP).  Particular attention should be paid to security 
incidents as Saudi militants begin to return from fighting in Iraq.50   
The conclusion of the matter is that Saudi Arabia is not the next Iran, on the 
precipice of a radical Islamic overthrow.  But the royal family faces myriad challenges in 
the medium to long term, and, as Mr. Clarke suggests the US is at risk of a future and 
spectacular intelligence failure because we are unable to “effectively collect intelligence 
inside “the kingdom”” (Clarke, 2005).  US policy makers would be well advised to take 
advantage of the relative calm now to invest in closing the hole in our knowledge of 
Saudi informal urban networks in order to be prepared for the eventuality of a Khomeini-




                                                 
49 Disagreeable princes have, in the past, found themselves conducting extended, albeit opulent, stays 
abroad. 
50 While the numbers of Saudi fighters are disputed, they almost surely do not rival the numbers of 
young Saudis who ventured abroad on Saudi-government-subsidized trips to participate in the Afghan 
campaign against the Soviets.  Many of the Saudis who fought in Afghanistan were there for short 
durations on the periphery of the campaign—a relatively small number became hardened veterans, and only 
time will tell if a similarly combat-experienced core of Iraq veterans emerges. 
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